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ABSTRACT
Anonymous credentials (ACs) are a powerful cryptographic tool
for the secure use of digital services, when simultaneously aim-
ing for strong privacy guarantees of users combined with strong
authentication guarantees for providers of services. They allow
users to selectively prove possession of attributes encoded in a
credential without revealing any other meaningful information
about themselves. While there is a significant body of research on
AC systems, modern use-cases of ACs such as mobile applications
come with various requirements not sufficiently considered so far.
These include preventing the sharing of credentials and coping
with resource constraints of the platforms (e.g., smart cards such as
SIM cards in smartphones). Such aspects are typically out of scope
of AC constructions, and, thus AC systems that can be considered
entirely practical have been elusive so far.
In this paper we address this problem by introducing and for-
malizing the notion of core/helper anonymous credentials (CHAC).
The model considers a constrained core device (e.g., a SIM card) and
a powerful helper device (e.g., a smartphone). The key idea is that
the core device performs operations that do not depend on the size
of the credential or the number of attributes, but at the same time
the helper device is unable to use the credential without its help.
We present a provably secure generic construction of CHACs using
a combination of signatures with flexible public keys (SFPK) and
the novel notion of aggregatable attribute-based equivalence class
signatures (AAEQ) along with a concrete instantiation. The key
characteristics of our scheme are that the size of showing tokens
is independent of the number of attributes in the credential(s) and
that the core device only needs to compute a single elliptic curve
scalar multiplication, regardless of the number of attributes. We
confirm the practical efficiency of our CHACs with an implemen-
tation of our scheme on a Multos smart card as the core and an
Android smartphone as the helper device. A credential showing
requires less than 500 ms on the smart card and around 200 ms on
the smartphone (even for a credential with 1000 attributes).
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1 INTRODUCTION
Anonymous credential systems (ACs), envisioned by Chaum [33] in
the 1980ies and meanwhile found as commercial products such as
U-Prove [65] or Idemix [30], allow users to obtain digital credentials
from an issuer and to prove possession of attributes encoded in
a credential, e.g., just prove that the holder is over 21 years old,
to verifiers without revealing any other meaningful information
about themselves. Typically, a credential contains a number of at-
tributes, e.g. a collection of attributes such as age, address, gender,
etc. for human credential holders or a potentially large number
of attributes describing a platform and its configuration, e.g., for
remote attestation.
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These attributes can be selectively shown and
thus support minimum disclosure, i.e., only information that is
required for the particular application is revealed. The reason why
ACs are considered useful is because they provide strong authenti-
cation and in addition strong privacy. This means that verifiers can
be convinced that users really hold credentials from an issuer when
the authentication is successful, but at the same time the credential
issuer and verifiers (even if they collaborate) cannot link credentials
to a specific session with the user.
There are two variants of ACs, namely one-show and multi-show.
If ACs are one-show private, with U-Prove [65] being the most well
known representative, then each credential can only be used once
in an unlinkable way (i.e., multiple showings can be linked). While
this might pose serious limitations in some settings, it has recently
been found real-world applications and in particular in the form of
PrivacyPass [41] by Cloudflare (available as extensions for Chrome
and Firefox), the enhanced variant by Google [56] being integrated
1
Remote attestation allows a verifier to determine a level of trust in the integrity
of the platform of another system, i.e., the machine that holds the credential.
into the Trust Tokens API
2
or the PrivateStats proposal by Face-
book.
3
A stronger variant of ACs is calledmulti-show private, which
additionally guarantees that the repeated use of the same credential
is unlinkable. The latter is a much more general and typically more
desirable notion and we are exclusively focusing on multi-show
ACs in this paper.
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Multi-show ACs have a variety of applications
such as access control to online-service [68], anonymous subscrip-
tions [12, 57], e-tickets [50, 61] or point collection systems [14, 15].
A recent large scale real-world application of such ACs is the real-
ization of private groups within the popular Signal messenger [32].




ments and claims chained to immutable (hardware-based) roots of
trust via recent AC constructions [38, 39, 45].
Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [28] were the first to fully construct
this cryptographic primitive. Their scheme is based on so-called
CL-signatures that use RSA groups and allow to efficiently prove
knowledge of a signature. In their follow-up work [29] they con-
struct CL-signatures from bilinear groups and more schemes follow
their template, e.g., [58, 66]. Brands [18] proposed an alternative
construction (later made provably secure in [3]) that uses pairing-
free groups at the expense of multi-show privacy. Besides the al-
ready mentioned constructions of ACs, there is significant research
into different approaches to construct AC systems with various
trade-offs in bandwidth, computational efficiency and security (e.g.,
[3, 27, 42, 45, 48, 69]). We will compare our approach to the most
important ones later. Furthermore, there are various variants of
ACs such as keyed-verification [31, 37], updatable [14, 36], dele-
gatable [7, 13, 38], decentralized [46, 73] or cloud-based ACs [55],
further broadening the scope of potential applications.
Preventing unauthorized sharing of credentials. The use of
ACs in commercial products such as U-Prove or Idemix created new
problems such as the sharing of credentials, allowing for instance
non-paying or non-authorized users to gain access to a service (e.g.,
watch R-rated movies). A simple solution is to store the credential
inside a secure hardware device (secure element) such as a smart
card, which makes sharing a credential practically infeasible. This
not only solves the problem of dishonest users, but provides an addi-
tional layer of security for credentials of honest users. It also allows
applying ACs in e-government applications [11], since electronic
identities (e-IDs) are usually based on smart cards. The problem
that one encounters here, however, is that the AC constructions
mentioned before are not designed having this in mind. Thus their
efficiency is only practical on rather powerful devices such as PCs
or smartphones, but fails on constrained devices such as a smart
card providing much less memory and processing capabilities. Thus,
they are typically far too inefficient for the use in such a setting.
Anonymous credentials on constrained devices. There were
several attempts to implement ACs on smart cards. Bichsel et. al.






Note that every multi-show AC can easily be turned into a one-show AC by
including a unique attribute that always needs to be shown.
5
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Unfortunately, for a meaningful security parameter, their imple-
mentation required more than 16 seconds to perform a showing. A
more practical implementation was proposed by Mostowski and
Vullers [63]. They implemented U-Prove like one-show ACs on a
smart card in Multos technology [60], where proving possession
of 1 of 5 attributes in a credential takes around 0.9s (Bjones et
al. [11] report about 0.5s for 10 undisclosed attributes). Recently
Camenisch et. al. in [23] proposed a construction and smart card
implementation of keyed-verification ACs [31], a restricted class of
ACs where the issuer is also the verifier. They achieve execution
times similar to the aforementioned one in [63]. A somewhat dif-
ferent approach to ACs was proposed by Batina et. al. [6]. Here,
a credential is associated with a randomizable certificate on the
user’s public key (which can also be randomized). Therefore, each
credential corresponds to a single attribute. For a showing, the user
randomizes the public key, the certificate, and signs a nonce send
by the verifier. The concrete construction uses self-blindable cer-
tificates by Verheul [74] and their implementation requires around
3s to show one credential/attribute at a 100 bit security level.
Drawbacks of existing implementations. The main drawback
of all these implementations is that the execution time on the smart
card depends on the number of attributes and either increases with
the number of disclosed or undisclosed attributes but always lin-
early increases with the number of attributes inside the credential.
Due to this reason, the application of smart card based ACs is lim-
ited to cases where the user possess only a very small number of
attributes and very soon gets impractical in use-cases that require
more attributes. For smart cards, Mostowski and Vullers in [63]
report that adding an attribute to the credential increases the execu-
tion time of a showing by around 0.1s. We stress that while in case
of PC or smartphone implementations one still notices the linear
increase in execution time, it is significantly less problematic than
in case of smart cards.
On the number of attributes. Attributes provided by govern-
mental issuers usually reflect basic personal information about the
credential holder (e.g. name, gender, age, address). However, there
are many scenarios where additional attributes can be defined. In
particular, the IRMA pilot implementation of AC’s developed by
the Privacy by Design Foundation
6
provided several real-world at-
tributes considered by the industry/government like diplomas, cer-
tificates, or even membership IDs for online services (e.g. Facebook
ID). Moreover, in the context of eIDs in some European countries,
e.g., Austria or Germany, service-specific pseudonyms are used for
authentication and computing them on the fly would be too expen-
sive. Therefore a more efficient approach would be to store them
as attributes inside the credential. It is worth noting that in Austria
according to [54] there are around 30 of them for governmental
purposes and potentially many more for other industrial purposes.
Attributes however can not only be used to describe individuals
but are also useful to reflect properties of the user’s platform or
other devices like servers. For example, when basing access control
on the configuration of the platform, one can consider binary at-
tributes such as whether a certain software, e.g. antivirus, or some
hardware, e.g. certain sensor type, is present. Note there could be
6
https://privacybydesign.foundation/attribute-index/en/
numerous such attributes and in addition those properties could
also be arbitrarily valued, e.g., OS type, version, hardware vendor.
In such a case the number of attributes in the system is likely to be
large.
As efficiency of the system is influenced by the number of at-
tributes in the credentials, this aspect gets even more important
considering examples like the ones above where the number of po-
tential attributes in some scenarios can be in the tens to hundreds.
Our goals and setting. To overcome the aforementioned prob-
lems, we consider splitting the overall computations between a
resource constrained device, e.g., a secure element (SE) such as a
smart card in Figure 1 (the core), and a much more powerful host
device, e.g., a primary device such as a smartphone in Figure 1 (the
helper). And in particular our goal is to consider this core/helper
setting already in the formal AC model. The motivation comes from
the observation that nowadays platforms that use ACs (e.g., PCs,
smartphones) typically are equipped with secure elements (SEs)
in form of dedicated hardware modules, e.g., the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM)
7
or SIM cards that are designed to handle secrets
(such as secret keys for ACs). Besides, many modern processors
come with hardware-enforced isolation that is already built into the
CPU and allows to build trusted execution environments (TEE), e.g.,
TrustZone by Arm or the Software Guard Extensions (SGX) by Intel.
Such TEEs feature isolated execution of user processes and are also
used to emulate TPM functionality [67] (e.g., Intel fTPM). Since
there is a huge body on recent practical microarchitectural attacks
on TEEs, this however questions their adequacy for cryptographic
applications (cf. [40, 70]). Consequently, we focus on hardware
SEs such as TPMs or SIM cards more suitable for handling crypto-
graphic keys.
8
Nevertheless, insights from an implementation and
its performance on such constrained SEs gives us a good baseline,
as performance will only get better if we move to “software-based”
TEEs like TrustZone or SGX.
Now, any such SE (core device) depends on a host device (the
helper) that provides power supply and acts as a gateway to the out-
side world. Besides TPMs and SIM cards in PCs and smartphones,
this is also true for the Internet of Things (IoT), where smaller and
constrained devices are connected to a more powerful IoT hub. In
most applications, the used helper device is owned by the user
and can be leveraged to perform part of the computation and can
also be used to store larger amounts of data. So while we consider
the helper to be potentially malicious, a well known problem in
such a setting is that a corrupted helper device can always break
the privacy of an AC system, e.g., by adding identifying metadata
before finalizing the showing with a verifier. This can obviously not
be checked by the core device. But we can take advantage of this
fact and prioritize the efficiency of the core at the expense of pro-
tecting privacy against the helper.
9
Nevertheless, we do not want
to tolerate that a malicious helper can show a credential without
interacting with the core. Consequently, we require that as long




Although it clearly needs to be mentioned that these are not immune against
attacks (cf. [62] for recent timing side-channels in TPMs.)
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Note that this can never be prevented by the core device and in practice it is
more likely that malware running on the helper device will use this approach to leak
private information about the user than breaking the actual cryptographic scheme.
of a credential at the helper, the core needs to be involved in order
to result in a valid showing of the credential and even a malicious
helper cannot succeed.
High-level overview of our CHAC approach.We are now ready
to provide a high-level overview of our core/helper anonymous
credentials (CHAC) approach (cf. Figure 1). Initially, the core gen-
erates a secret key 1○ which never leaves the core; the user can
now obtain multiple credentials from an issuer by 2○ sending a
request, which is then 3○ passed to the core (ensuring that core
needs to be involved in obtaining credentials) and after the issuing
4○ is finished, the credentials are stored at the helper 5○. For a
showing, the helper first triggers a request 6○, which is then passed
to the core 7○ (again ensuring that core needs to be involved). Then,
depending on the attributes that need to be selectively shown (all
other remain undisclosed) the helper can aggregate them from po-
tentially different credentials into a compact showing token 8○.
Note that while for certain applications (e.g., the core being a SIM
card in the smartphone) batching may not be so important, but if
we for instance consider a standalone NFC based smart card, the
communication between the core and the smartphone is limited
because of the way the user has to physically interface both devices.
Therefore some kind of batching (aggregation) is desirable, i.e., the
  
Figure 1: High-level overview of our approach.
helper device should be able to accumulate many showing tokens
for the core into a single compact one. Finally, the helper sends the
resulting showing token to the verifier 9○ who either accepts or
rejects. Showings can be performed with different verifiers and an
arbitrary number of times without the showings being linkable to
each other.
Previous work in the core/helper setting. In order to put our
CHAC approach into context, we will look at one well known ex-
ample for the core/helper setting. Namely, the direct anonymous
attestation (DAA) protocol [20, 22] designed for privacy-preserving
remote attestation of platforms. Here the core device is the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM), a specialized chip supporting DAA, and
the helper is a PC. Technically, DAA is not an AC system, but rather
a group signature scheme [34] (without the anonymity revocation
capability), but with a mechanism to detect rogue members and op-
tional linkability. It can be considered as the most widely deployed
protocol for anonymous authentication in practice
10
. Previously,
there have been informal discussions on how a TPM can be used to-
gether with CL-credentials in [21] as well as explicit constructions
10
An enhanced DAA with revocation capabilities is called Enhanced Privacy ID
(EPID) [19] and revocation was later also adopted for existing DAA [22, 25]. EPID,
however, is not designed for the core/helper setting.
Scheme Show (Core/Helper) Verify |Cred| |Show|
[25] (DAA-A) 3G1 / O(𝑈G1) O(𝐿G1) + 2𝑃 2Z𝑝 + 2G1 O(𝑈Z𝑝 ) + 4G1
[22] (DAA-A) 3G1 / O(𝑈G1) O(𝐿G1) + 2𝑃 2Z𝑝 + 2G1 O(𝑈Z𝑝 ) + 4G1
[26] (DAA-A)
a
3G1 / O(𝐿G1) O(𝐿G1) + 4𝑃 O(𝐿G1) O(𝐿(G1 + Z𝑝 ))
CHAC 1G1 / O(𝐷 (G1 + G2)) O(𝐷𝑃) O(𝐿(G1 + G2)) 6G1 + 3G2
a
This LRSW based DAA scheme is supported in FIDO. Though it does not support attributes, for completeness we include a projection of
its complexity if realized as DAA-A based on the LRSW based DAA-A in [35].
Table 1: Comparison of CHAC with existing DAA-A constructions. | · | denotes sizes and otherwise computational effort. For
Type-3 pairings and the BN-256 curve we have in bits |G2 | = 2 · |G1 |, |G1 | = 2 · |Z𝑝 |, and |Z𝑝 | = 256.
that extend DAA with attributes (DAA-A) and selective attribute
disclosure [22, 25, 35], bringing it closer to AC systems. DAA(-A)
constructions however are proven secure in a formal model that
exactly captures DAA(-A), with a long line of failed security no-
tions [22, 26], and a design tailored towards a specific core device
being the TMP (2.0). With CHAC, our aim is to have a simpler and
much more general model not tailored to a specific core device.
We note that CHAC can be an alternative to DAA in some of its
use-cases, but due to DAA(-A)’s focus on specific features, e.g.,
linkability, it is not intended to be a replacement.
Since all aforementioned DAA constructions follow the same
template, they all have the same inherent performance drawbacks.
In Table 1 we compare our CHAC construction to the recent DAA-A
proposals, where we denote 𝑘 exponentiations in group G𝑖 in a
bilinear group (G1,G2,G𝑇 , 𝑒, 𝑝) with pairing 𝑒 : G1 × G2 → G𝑇
by 𝑘G𝑖 and 𝑘𝑃 denotes 𝑘 pairing operations. Moreover, we denote
by 𝐿 the number of attributes and by 𝐷 and 𝑈 the number of se-
lectively disclosed and undisclosed attributes respectively. We see
that CHAC asymptotically improves over DAA-A and concretely
we improve significantly on the core (the most critical part) and
size of the showing token. For practical applications, where one
can assume that 𝐷 ≪ 𝑈 as this is the main use-case of a selective
disclosure tool for privacy, we also improve significantly (cf. Sec-
tion 5 for a detailed discussion). We note that while our credentials
are larger compared to other work, they are stored on the helper
device where storage space is not an issue. Moreover, for practical
numbers of attributes the credentials are still relatively small, i.e.,
around 200KB for 100 attributes.
Scheme |Params| Show Verify |Cred| |Show|
[45, 48] O(𝐿) O(𝑈 ) O(𝐷) O(1) O(1)
[27] O(𝐿) O(𝑈 ) O(𝐷) O(1) O(1)
[69] O(𝐿2) O(𝑈 ) O(𝐷) O(1) O(1)
[49] O(𝐿) O(1) O(𝐷) O(𝐿) O(1)
CHAC O(𝐿) O(𝐷) O(𝐷) O(𝐿) O(1)
Table 2: Comparison of CHAC (merging core and helper)
with conventional ACs designed for selective disclosure.
Comparing core/helper ACs to conventional ACs. Finally, for
the sake of completeness we want to put our CHAC approach into
context of existing conventional state-of-the-art AC systems that
do not consider this core and helper separation. We focus on ACs
that like our approach provide constant-size selective showing of
attributes [27, 45, 48, 49, 69, 73]. Since this is not our main focus of
the paper, in Table 2 we only provide an asymptotic comparison of
the characteristics when using our CHAC approach as a conven-
tional AC system by merging the core and helper functionality into
a single entity. A rough comparison based on expensive operations,
i.e., group exponentiations and pairings,
11
and for fairness assum-
ing that 𝐷 = 𝑈 < 𝐿 yields that for [45, 48] showing and verification
are equivalent. [69] has comparable verification efficiency but less
efficient showings. In the recent concurrent and independent work
in [49], which also uses an aggregatable approach as in our construc-
tion, verification is equivalent, but their showing is more efficient
and requires only a constant number of expensive operations. Fi-
nally, the showing of the most compact scheme from [27] includes
around 100 group elements and the computational costs are not
even evaluated, but can be assumed too high in practice (especially
for constrained devices).
Note, however, that vice versa it is not straightforwardly possible
for the other AC approaches to achieve our core/helper separation.
As can be seen, while our CHAC approach has larger credentials,
which as discussed above is not really an issue, we outperform all
existing approaches in that the computation within showing and
verification is in the number 𝐷 of disclosed attributes, a number
that is typically very small compared to𝑈 and 𝐿 in practical privacy-
preserving applications. Consequently, our CHAC approach also
yields an interesting alternative when not requiring this core/helper
separation.
1.1 Our Contribution and Technical Overview
Our contributions can be summarized in points as follows:
Formal framework for CHAC. We formalize a cryptographic
primitive called core/helper anonymous credentials (CHAC). The
key idea is that the core device performs operations that do not
depend on the size of the credential or the number of attributes.
While we cannot guarantee privacy in front of a malicious helper
device, we however require that even a malicious helper device is
not able to perform a credential showing without the help of the
core. In particular, after 𝑛 showings by the core, even a malicious
helper is not able to produce more than 𝑛 valid showings. We call
the later property dependability. Besides the usual unforgeability
and anonymity, which are defined similarly to previous work on
ACs, we also consider a property called compactness. It states that
the size of showing of a credential (called show token) should be
independent of the number of disclosed/undisclosed attributes.
Generic construction.We provide a construction of CHACs in-
spired by the approach to construct single-attribute credentials
11
A comparison based on implementations would be very interesting, but for most
schemes no open implementations are available.
from self-blindable certificates [6]. However, instead of using Ver-
heul’s scheme [74], we instantiate self-blindable credentials us-
ing the approach by Backes et. al. [1]. They introduced signa-
tures with flexible public keys (SFPK) and showed that they can
be efficiently combined with signatures on equivalence classes
(SPS-EQ) [43, 45, 48, 53, 59]. In brief, SFPK are signatures where
the key space is partitioned into equivalence classes and a signer
can efficiently change a key pair to a different representative of the
same class that is indistinguishable from a newly generated one.
SPS-EQ are signatures where the message space is partitioned into
equivalence classes and everyone can update a signature to another
representative of the message class, where the resulting signature
is indistinguishable from a fresh one. We will usually denote this
update operation (the change of representative) by adapt.
The starting point for our generic construction is to represent a
credential as a SPS-EQ signature on a SFPK public key and the core
device just generates a SFPK signature. The helper device adapts
the SFPK public key, randomizes the SFPK signature and adapts
the SPS-EQ signature to the updated SFPK public key. Unfortu-
nately, similar to [6], this only yields a single-attribute credential.
To overcome this limitation, we build upon the notion of SPS-EQ
and introduce two cryptographic primitives that are of indepen-
dent interest: tag-based equivalence class signatures (TBEQ) and
aggregatable attribute-based equivalence class signatures (AAEQ).
In contrary to standard equivalence class signatures, TBEQ allow
to additionally include a tag (an attribute value) when signing a
message (class). AAEQ then allow to aggregate multiple TBEQ
signatures under different keys (representing attributes) and tags
(representing attribute values) on the same message (representa-
tive). In our construction, we then use AAEQ instead of SPS-EQ
in the above template, which allows us to aggregate multiple cer-
tificates to different attributes and attribute values into a single
one. In other words, during the show procedure the helper device
randomizes the SFPK signature and adapts the public key, chooses
the certificates corresponding to the disclosed attributes, aggre-
gates them into a single compact AAEQ signature and adapts it to
the updated SFPK public key. The core device still only generates
the SFPK signature and thus the helper device is unable to use the
credential without a valid SFPK signature from the core device.
Efficient CHAC instantiation.We instantiate the construction
described above using schemes that are secure in the generic group
model [72] and in addition use random oracles [8]. We note that
both are idealized assumptions and it would be more favorable to
have a scheme secure only in the ROM or even in the standard
model. Unfortunately, we do not yet have building blocks available
that are efficient and do not require such assumptions. As our main
motivation is a highly practical solution, we opted for efficiency at
the cost of idealized assumptions.
Our SFPK signature builds upon the one by Backes et. al. [2],
but we replace the programmable Waters hash function [75] with
a random oracle. We instantiate our primitives in Type-3 bilinear
groups BG = (G1,G2,G𝑇 , 𝑒, 𝑝) using the popular BN-256 curve
[4] and the optimal ate pairing 𝑒 : G1 × G2 → G𝑇 . The signing
process involves operations in G2 = 𝐸 (F𝑝2 ) which are not natively
supported by smart cards and should be avoided. Therefore, we
showhow to securely split the signing process into three steps: a pre-
computation step that is performed only once, the main part that
only involves operations in G1, natively supported by smart cards,
and a finalization step that can be performed without the secret
key. This allows for the core device to pre-compute certain data
once and then only sign using operations in G1 where the helper
device will finalize the SFPK signature and perform operations in
G2. We call this extension SFPK with split signing.
Our tag-based equivalence class signature (TBEQ) is based upon
the SPS-EQ scheme from [44] extended with one component repre-
senting a one-time BLS signature [16] on the tag in group G2 using
the randomness of the SPS-EQ scheme as a one-time signing key.
The corresponding verification key is already part of the SPS-EQ
scheme from [44]. Similar to [44] we analyze its security in the
generic group model. In order to construct a provably secure aggre-
gatable attribute-based equivalence class (AAEQ) scheme, we use
parallel copies of this TBEQ scheme with independent keys, where
all instances compute the signing randomness deterministically
using a PRF evaluation on the message using a shared PRF key. We
again prove it secure in the generic group model.
Efficient CHAC implementation.We provide an efficient pro-
totype implementation that uses a Multos smart card as the core
device and a smartphone with a Snapdragon 710 processor and
6GB RAM running Android 10.0 to implement the helper device
and verification algorithm. For a comprehensive evaluation, we
execute the same code on a PC (laptop) with Intel i7-7660U CPU
@ 2.50 GHz with 16GB RAM. The execution time on the core de-
vice with the BN-256 curve (providing around 100-bit of security)
is < 0.5s. The helper device part for credentials even with 1000
attributes takes ≈ 200ms for the smartphone and 15ms for the PC
which respectively adds to 0.7s and 0.5s for a full showing of 1000
attributes. Verification of such a show token takes ≈ 800ms on
the PC and ≈ 100ms if we assume that the verifier knows the set
of potential attribute/value pairs and does some pre-computation.
For show tokens with 10 and 100 attributes, the verification takes
respectively 140ms and 200ms even without this optimization. The
most computationally expensive operation is the issuing which
takes ≈ 200ms and ≈ 1s for credentials with 10 and 100 attributes
respectively. However, we show that issuing can be distributed and
the workload decreases with the number of used cores/servers.
Extensions and Optimization. Finally, we discuss various exten-
sions and optimizations of our CHAC instantiation.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We denote by 𝑦 ←$ A(𝑥) the execution of algorithm A on input 𝑥
and with output 𝑦. By 𝑟 ←$ 𝑆 we mean that 𝑟 is chosen uniformly at
random from set 𝑆 . We will use 1G to denote the identity element
in group G and [𝑛] to denote the set {1, . . . , 𝑛}. We will denote a
bilinear group as BG = (G1,G2,G𝑇 , 𝑒, 𝑝) and will consider Type-
3 pairings, i.e., there is no efficiently computable isomorphism
betweenG1 andG2. Finally, byAO we denote an algorithmA that
has access to oracle O. We defer some further notation that is not
required in the main body of the paper to Appendix A.1.
2.1 Signatures on Equivalence Classes
Structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes (SPS-EQ) [45,
48] sign vectors of length ℓ > 1 from one of the prime order 𝑝 source
groups G𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}) of a bilinear group BG. We can view Zℓ𝑝 as a
vector space and one can define a projective equivalence relation





classes. An SPS-EQ-scheme signs equivalence classes [𝑀] of vec-
tors 𝑀 ∈ (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ with equivalence relation: 𝑀, 𝑁 ∈ Gℓ
𝑖
: 𝑀 ∼R
𝑁 ⇔ ∃ 𝑠 ∈ Z∗𝑝 : 𝑀 = 𝑁 𝑠 , i.e., scaling the message by 𝑠 .
Definition 2.1 (SPS-EQ). An SPS-EQ scheme SPS-EQ on message
space (G∗
𝑖
) for 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} consists of the following PPT algorithms.
Setup(1_): on input a security parameter 1_ , outputs group BG.
KeyGen(BG, ℓ): on input BG and message vector length ℓ > 1,
outputs a key pair (pk, sk).
Sign(sk, 𝑀): on input a secret key sk and representative𝑀 ∈ (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ ,
outputs a signature 𝜎 for equivalence class [𝑀].
ChgRep(𝑀,𝜎, `, pk): on input representative𝑀 ∈ (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ of equiv-
alence class [𝑀], a signature 𝜎 on𝑀 , a value ` and a public key
pk, returns an updated message-signature pair (𝑀 ′, 𝜎 ′), where
the new representative is 𝑀 ′ = 𝑀` and 𝜎 ′ its corresponding
(or, updated) signature.
Verify(pk, 𝑀, 𝜎): is a deterministic algorithm and, on input a public
key pk, a representative𝑀 ∈ (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ , and a signature 𝜎 outputs
a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}.
VKey(sk, pk): is a deterministic algorithm and, on input secret key
sk and a public key pk, checks if it represents a valid key pair
and outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}.
We provide formal definitions of security in Appendix A.3.
2.2 Signatures with Flexible Public Key
Signatures with flexible public key (SFPK) [1] are signatures that
provide relations [pk]R on public keys. The main property is called
class-hiding and states that it is hard to decide if a random public
key is in a relation to a different public key. We use the class-
hiding definition with key corruption introduced in [2], where the
adversary gets the secret keys. This definition is weaker than in [1],
but allows to instantiate this primitive with a shorter (and optimal)
public key of 2 group elements, as shown in [2].
Definition 2.2 (SFPK). A SFPK scheme is a set of 𝑃𝑃𝑇 algorithms
such that:
SFPK.CRSGen(1_): on input a security parameter 1_ , outputs a
trapdoor 𝛿𝜌 and a common reference string 𝜌 , which is an
implicit input for all the algorithms.
SFPK.KeyGen(1_): on input a security parameter 1_ outputs a key
pair (sk, pk).
SFPK.TKGen(1_): on input a security parameter 1_ outputs a key
pair (sk, pk), and a trapdoor 𝛿 .
SFPK.Sign(sk,𝑚): on input a message𝑚 ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a signing
key sk, outputs a signature Sig.
SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿, pk′): on input a trapdoor 𝛿 for some equivalence
class [pk]R and public key pk′, outputs 1 if pk′ ∈ [pk]R and 0
otherwise.
SFPK.ChgPK(pk, 𝑟 ): on input a representative pk of equivalence
class [pk]R and random coins 𝑟 , outputs a different representa-
tive pk′, where pk′ ∈ [pk]R .
SFPK.ChgSK(sk, 𝑟 ): on input a secret key sk and random coins 𝑟 ,
outputs an updated secret key sk′.
SFPK.Verify(pk,𝑚, Sig): on input a message𝑚, signature Sig and
public verification key pk, outputs 1 if the signature is valid
and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2.3 (Canonical Representative). Let canon be a predi-
cate that holds for exactly one public key in a given class. We say
pkSFPK is a canonical representative if canon(pkSFPK) = 1.
We provide the formal security definitions in Appendix A.2.
3 NEW RESULTS AND BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section we provide new results on SFPK signatures and
introduce tag-based equivalence class (TBEQ) signatures as well as
aggregatable attribute-based equivalence class (AAEQ) signatures.
3.1 Efficient SFPK with Split Signing
We base our SFPK signature scheme on the one by Backes et al.
[2], but we replace the programmable Waters hash function [75]
with a hash function H modeled as a random oracle. This allows
us to increase the efficiency of the signing process, i.e., we replace
𝑂 (_) group operations in G1 with one hashing to G1. The change
requires us to prove security in the random oracle model. However,
it also allows us to securely divide the signing process so that in
our CHAC the core only performs operations in G1 and can seek
support by the helper device to finish the signing process without
knowing the secret key.
SFPK.CRSGen(1_) : generate BG ←$ BGGen(_) , choose 𝑦 ←$ Z∗𝑝 and
compute 𝑌1 = 𝑔
𝑦
1
and 𝑌2 = 𝑔
𝑦
2
. Set 𝜌 = (BG, 𝑌1, 𝑌2) .




SFPK.TKGen(1_) : choose 𝑥 ←$ Z∗𝑝 . Set pkSFPK = (𝑔1, 𝑔𝑥1 ) , skSFPK =
(𝑌𝑥
1
, pkSFPK) , and 𝛿SFPK = (𝑔𝑥2 ) .
SFPK.Sign(skSFPK,𝑚) : given a message𝑚 ∈ {0, 1}_ , choose 𝑟 ←$ Z∗𝑝 and
return the signature SigSFPK = (𝑌𝑥1 · H(𝑚)𝑟 , 𝑔𝑟1 , 𝑔𝑟2 ) .
SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, 𝑟 ) : Parse pkSFPK = (𝐴, 𝐵) and compute pk′SFPK =
(𝐴𝑟 , 𝐵𝑟 ) . Return pk′SFPK.
SFPK.ChgSK(skSFPK, 𝑟 ) : Parse skSFPK = (𝑌𝑥1 , pkSFPK) and
compute pk′SFPK ← SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, 𝑟 ) , and return
sk′SFPK = ( (𝑌
𝑥
1
)𝑟 , pk′SFPK) .
SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿SFPK, pkSFPK) : pkSFPK = (𝐴, 𝐵) . Return 1 iff
𝑒 (𝐴,𝛿SFPK) = 𝑒 (𝐵,𝑔2) .
SFPK.Verify(pkSFPK,𝑚, SigSFPK) : parse SigSFPK as (Sig1SFPK, Sig
2
SFPK,
Sig3SFPK) , parse pkSFPK as (𝐴, 𝐵) . Return 1 iff
𝑒 (Sig2SFPK, 𝑔2) = 𝑒 (𝑔1, Sig
3
SFPK) and
𝑒 (Sig1SFPK, 𝑔2) = 𝑒 (𝐵,𝑌2) · 𝑒 (H(𝑚), Sig
3
SFPK) .
Scheme 1: Our SFPK Signature Scheme
Split signing. Scheme 1 requires the signer to perform operations
in G2 which are usually inefficient on constrained devices and
influence the execution time significantly. We will now describe a
technique that allows splitting the signing procedure between two
parties. We will later identify them by the core and helper devices.
The party holding the secret key (core) performs only operations in
G1 and creates pre-signatures that are finalized by the second party
(helper). Unforgeability of the scheme will hold against the helper
device but we will require the core to perform a one-time-only
pre-computation that will involve operations in G2. More formally.
Definition 3.1. We say that a SFPK scheme supports split sign-










: takes as input the security parameters 1_ and outputs
a secret state stsecr and a public state stpub.
SFPK.Sign
2
: takes the same inputs as SFPK.Sign and additionally
stsecr and outputs a pre-signature pSigSFPK.
SFPK.Sign
3
: on input a pre-signature pSigSFPK and the public state
stpub this algorithm outputs the final signature SigSFPK.
Additionally, we require that 1) the distribution of signatures out-
put by SFPK.Sign
3
is identical to the output of SFPK.Sign, 2) un-
forgeability holds with respect to pre-signatures even if a pair
(stsecr, stpub) is reused, i.e., both signing oracles in the unforgeabil-
ity experiment are initialized with an output of SFPK.Sign
1
and
output pre-signatures instead of full-signatures.
We will now sketch the idea how to split the signing procedure
in Scheme 1. We will use the core/helper naming convention to
describe the two parties.
The only operation in G2 performed during signing is the com-
putation of 𝑔𝑟
2
. Since 𝑟 is a random value, it suggests that the core
can just send it to the helper and let it compute Sig3SFPK (and
even Sig2SFPK). Unfortunately, this idea fails completely because
the helper would be able to extract the secret key 𝑌𝑥
1
from Sig1SFPK,
since it can compute H(𝑚)𝑟 . It is obvious that the randomness 𝑟
must be kept secret and must not leak to the helper.
Our approach is now to hide 𝑟 by pre-computing a value in G2,
namely𝑈 = 𝑔𝑢
2
for 𝑢 ←$ Z∗𝑝 . The core retains 𝑢, and shares𝑈 with
the helper. To sign a message, the core does not compute Sig3SFPK
but chooses 𝑘𝑢 ←$ Z∗𝑝 and sends it together with (Sig1SFPK, Sig
2
SFPK)
to the helper, who finalizes the signature by computing Sig3SFPK =
𝑈 𝑘𝑢 . To minimize the number of operations in G1 the core can use
the same idea for Sig2SFPK, i.e., it can send 𝑔
𝑢
1
to the helper, which
can use 𝑘𝑢 to compute Sig2SFPK.
To show that Scheme 1 supports split signing let:
SFPK.Sign
1






(skSFPK,𝑚, stsecr): choose 𝑟 ←$ Z∗𝑝 and return the pre-
signature pSigSFPK = (𝑌𝑥1 · H(𝑚)
𝑟 , 𝑟 · 𝑘−1).
SFPK.Sign
3
(pSigSFPK, stpub): parse pSigSFPK = (Sig1SFPK,𝑤),













) is the way
Sig2SFPK and Sig
3












identical to the output of SFPK.Sign. The main difficulty is to show
that unforgeability holds in the sense as defined in Definition 3.1.
Theorem 3.2 (Unforgeability). Scheme 1 is an unforgeable
SFPK scheme with split signing in the random oracle model assuming
the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Proof. The proofs follows a similar strategy to the proof in [2],
but with small changes due to split signing. For completeness we
present the full proof of Theorem 3.2 in Appendix B.1. □
The following readily follows from [2].
Theorem 3.3 (Class-hiding). Scheme 1 is class-hiding with key
corruption in the random oracle model assuming the decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption.
Lemma 3.4 (Canonical Representative). A predicate defined
as canon((𝐴, 𝐵)) := 𝐴 ≡ 𝑔1 can be used to identify canonical rep-
resentatives in Scheme 1. Note that by defining canon this way the
SFPK.KeyGen algorithm outputs keys in canonical representation.
Third party re-randomization. A useful property that was not
defined in previous work on SFPK is re-randomization of the full
signature/public key pair. In the original work, the authors consider
changing representation of the public key before the actual signa-
ture. We show that there exists an algorithm (pk′SFPK, Sig
′
SFPK) ←
SFPK.ReRand(pkSFPK,𝑚, SigSFPK, 𝑟 ) for which we have pk′SFPK ←
SFPK.ChgPK(pkSFPK, 𝑟 ) and SFPK.Verify(pk′SFPK,𝑚, Sig
′
SFPK) = 1
where for the original signature SFPK.Verify(pkSFPK,𝑚, SigSFPK) =
1. We can define this algorithm as part of Scheme 1 as follows:
SFPK.ReRand(pkSFPK,𝑚, SigSFPK, 𝑟 ): parse SigSFPK = (Sig1SFPK,
Sig2SFPK, Sig
3
SFPK), choose random 𝑘 ←
$ Z∗𝑝 , compute pk
′
SFPK











3.2 Tag-Based Equivalence Class Signatures
Now, we introduce a variant of SPS-EQ or more precisely equiva-
lence class signatures (as they are not strictly structure-preserving
anymore) that in addition to the message 𝑀 being a representa-
tive of class [𝑀] support an auxiliary tag 𝜏 ∈ {0, 1}∗. Therefore,
we adapt the security model from SPS-EQ as follows. The task of
the adversary is to forge a signature for a message (𝑀∗, 𝜏∗) where
the adversary did not query a signature for the class [𝑀∗] and 𝜏∗
combination (cf. Appendix A.4). Moreover, for the adaption notion
which guarantees that signatures from ChgRep and Sign are identi-
cally distributed, we only require it to hold with respect to identical
auxiliary tags 𝜏 . Our construction is a modification of the SPS-EQ
scheme from [44] (denoted FHS15 henceforth) which is proven
to be EUF-CMA secure in the generic group model and provides
perfect adaption even under malicious keys. We do not provide an
abstract definition as the only changes to the SPS-EQ interface are
the additional input 𝜏 to the Sign and Verify algorithms. Our con-
struction of a tag-based equivalence class signature scheme (TBEQ)
is provided in Scheme 2 and it basically extends the FHS15 scheme
by a fourth signature element𝑉2 = 𝐻 (𝜏)
1
𝑦
where 𝐻 : {0, 1}∗ → G2
is modeled as a random oracle and 𝑦 is the signing randomness.
Note that 𝑉2 can be considered as a BLS signature [16] with the
signing randomness 1/𝑦 acting as a one-time signing key.
We will now show the unforgeability and perfect adaption of the
TBEQ in Scheme 2.
TBEQ .Setup(1_) : generate BG ←$ BGGen(_) , 𝐻 : {0, 1}∗ → G2 and
return params = (BG, 𝐻 ) .









TBEQ .Sign(sk, 𝑀, 𝜏) : parse sk = ®𝑥 , 𝑀 ∈ (G∗
1
)ℓ , 𝜏 ∈ {0, 1}∗ and choose

















𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉2 = 𝐻 (𝜏)
1
𝑦 .
Return 𝜎 = (𝑍1, 𝑌1, 𝑌2,𝑉2) .





















, . . . , pkℓ = 𝑔
𝑥ℓ
2
) , 𝑀 ∈
(G∗
1
)ℓ , 𝜏 ∈ {0, 1}∗ and 𝜎 = (𝑍1, 𝑌1, 𝑌2,𝑉2) . Return 1 if the following
checks hold and 0 otherwise:
ℓ∏
𝑖=1
𝑒 (𝑀𝑖 , pk𝑖 ) = 𝑒 (𝑍1, 𝑌2) ∧
𝑒 (𝑌1, 𝑔2) = 𝑒 (𝑔1, 𝑌2) ∧ 𝑒 (𝑔1,𝑉2) = 𝑒 (𝑌1, 𝐻 (𝜏))
Scheme 2: Our TBEQ Signature Scheme
Theorem 3.5. The TBEQ in Scheme 2 is EUF-CMA secure and
provides perfect adaption (under malicious keys) assuming that 𝐻 is
a random oracle.
We argue unforgeability in the generic bilinear group model
(following the proof of the FHS15 SPS-EQ in [45]) for a version of
our TBEQ without random oracles and a polynomially bounded tag-
space. Then, we will argue our modification in the random oracle
model with an unbounded tag space and constant size public keys.
The idea for a polynomially bounded tag space T = {𝜏1, . . . , 𝜏𝑘 } for
a 𝑘 ∈ poly(_) is to include additional uniformly random elements
(ℎ𝑖 ∈ G2)𝑖∈[𝑘 ] into pk and use the corresponding value ℎ𝑖 when
signing for tag 𝜏𝑖 instead of the hash evaluation 𝐻 (𝜏𝑖 ).
Lemma 3.6. The TBEQ in Scheme 2 with the above modifications
is EUF-CMA secure in the Type-3 generic bilinear group model.
We provide this proof in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 3.7. The TBEQ in Scheme 2 is EUF-CMA secure for an
unbounded tag-space when modeling 𝐻 as a random oracle.
Proof. Up to collisions in the random oracle, which happenwith
negligible probability, the TBEQ in Scheme 2 and in particular the
security analysis is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.6, but without
the restriction of the tag space being polynomial in size. □
Lemma 3.8. The TBEQ in Scheme 2 provides perfect adaption
(under malicious keys).
We provide this proof in Appendix B.3.
What we require for our further constructions is a derandom-
ized version of the TBEQ scheme. Subsequently, we formulate as
Lemma 3.9 (cf. [17]) a frequently used technique (see e.g., [9, 52]) to
derandomize any signature scheme, which in particular also holds
for TBEQ . Thus, we omit the proof.
Lemma 3.9. Let Σ = (Setup,KeyGen, Sign,ChgRep,Verify) be an
EUF-CMA secure TBEQ scheme and 𝐹 : K ×MTBEQ → RTBEQ be a
secure PRF, then Σ′ = (Σ.Setup,KeyGen′, Sign′, Σ.ChgRep, Σ.Verify)
is also EUF-CMA secure, where:
KeyGen′(BG, ℓ): Run (sk, pk) ← Σ.KeyGen(BG, ℓ), choose 𝑘 ←$ K
and return ((sk, 𝑘), pk).
Sign′(sk, 𝑀, 𝜏): Compute 𝑟 := 𝐹 (𝑘,𝑀) and return Σ.Sign(sk, 𝑀, 𝜏 ; 𝑟 ).
We denote the derandomized TBEQ by TBEQd. Note that in
Scheme 2 this means that in Sign we have 𝑦 ← 𝐹 (𝑘,𝑀).
3.3 Aggregatable Attribute-Based EQs
We now introduce another variant of equivalence class signatures
called aggregatable attribute-based equivalence class (AAEQ) sig-
natures, that will represent one core building block for our CHAC
system. In such a scheme there is a main key pair, which is akin
to identity-based signatures [71]. The main secret key can issue
signing keys for attributes (Attr), e.g., Attr =“age”. When signing a
message𝑀 (a representative of a class [𝑀]) with respect to such an
attribute signing key, signing additionally takes an attribute value
𝑣Attr, e.g., 𝑣Attr =“21”. The scheme is required to be aggregatable in
a sense that signatures under different attribute signing keys for the
same representative 𝑀 of a class can be aggregated into a compact
signature. Like in SPS-EQ , the signatures are with respect to classes
and there is a ChgRep algorithm to publicly change representatives
(i.e., adapt). For the sake of simplicity, below we assume that the
set of attributes represents the integers [𝑡] with domain {0, 1}∗ for
each attribute.
Definition 3.10 (Aggregatable Attribute-Based EQs). An aggregat-
able attribute-based equivalence class (AAEQ) signature scheme
consists of the following PPT algorithms:
Setup(1_, 𝑡, ℓ): on input security parameter 1_ , the number of at-
tributes 𝑡 (distinct attribute names) and length parameter ℓ this
algorithm outputs main key pair (msk,mpk).
AKGen(msk,Attr): on input a main secret keymsk and an attribute
Attr, outputs an attribute secret key skAttr.
Sign(skAttr, 𝑣Attr, 𝑀): on input an attribute secret key skAttr, an
attribute value 𝑣Attr and a representative 𝑀 , this algorithm
outputs a signature 𝜎 .
ChgRep(𝑀,𝜎, `,mpk): on input a representative𝑀 , a signature 𝜎 ,
a scalar ` and a main public key mpk, this algorithm outputs
an updated signature 𝜎 ′ for representative𝑀` .
Agg(mpk, {𝜎𝑖 }): on input a main public keympk and a set of valid
signatures {𝜎𝑖 }, outputs an aggregated signature 𝜎 ′.
Verify(mpk, {Attr𝑖 }, 𝜎 ′, 𝑀): on input a public key mpk, a set of
attributes {(Attr𝑖 , 𝑣Attr𝑖 )}, an aggregated signature 𝜎 ′ and a
representative𝑀 , outputs either accept(1) or reject(0).
We require an AAEQ to be correct, unforgeable and to provide
perfect adaption.We present the formal definitions in Appendix A.5.
Intuition of our construction.We now present a construction
with𝑂 (_) sizedmpk andmsk as Scheme 3 which is based upon the
TBEQ in Scheme 2 using the de-randomization (TBEQd). The idea
is simple and uses parallel instances of the derandomized TBEQd
scheme, where every pk represents a different attribute Attr (for
simplicity just integers in the set [𝑡], but this can easily be changed
to arbitrary strings, e.g., Attr =“age”). Now the basic idea is to use
the attribute value 𝑣Attr as the tag in the TBEQ scheme.
The intuition is that signatures for multiple different attributes
and the same representative𝑀 of class [𝑀] share the same random-
ness 𝑦 = 𝐹 (𝑘,𝑀) and thus from the set of𝑤 signatures {(𝑍1,𝑖 , 𝑌1,𝑖 ,
𝑌2,𝑖 ,𝑉2,𝑖 )}𝑖∈[𝑤 ] aggregation can easily be done by aggregating the
𝑍1,𝑖 components of all single signatures as well as the 𝑉2,𝑖 compo-
nents and use the𝑌1, 𝑌2 values of one of the signatures (note that all
with respect to the same mpk and same representative𝑀 use the
same randomness 𝑦 and are thus identical). Aggregate verification
is the verification of the TBEQ scheme using the componentwise
aggregation of the attribute public keys (see Scheme 3 for details).
Finally, the change representative algorithm is identical to the al-
gorithm of the underlying TBEQ . Note that for the simplicity of
presentation we assume that ChgRep and Agg only take valid sig-
natures as input (this can easily be handled by adding verification
of all input signatures to the respective algorithms).
AAEQ .Setup(1_, 𝑡, ℓ) : generate BG←$ BGGen(_) , choose 𝐻 : {0, 1}∗ →
G2 and set params = (BG, 𝐻 ) . Choose PRF key 𝑘 ←$ K and for 𝑖 ∈ [𝑡 ]
• choose ®𝑥𝑖 ←$ (Z∗𝑝 )ℓ , set pkAttr𝑖 = (𝑔
®𝑥𝑖
2
) and set skAttr𝑖 =
(pkAttr𝑖 , ®𝑥𝑖 , k) .
Set msk = (skAttr1 , . . . , skAttr𝑡 ) and mpk = (pkAttr1 , . . . , pkAttr𝑡 ) and
return (msk,mpk) .
AAEQ .AKGen(msk,Attr) : parse msk = (skAttr1 , . . . , skAttr𝑡 ) and Attr ∈
[𝑡 ] and return msk[Attr].
AAEQ .Sign(skAttr, 𝑣Attr, 𝑀) : parse skAttr = (pkAttr, ®𝑥, 𝑘) , 𝑣Attr ∈ {0, 1}∗,
𝑀 ∈ (G∗
1


















, 𝑉2 = 𝐻Attr (𝑣Attr)
1
𝑦 .





AAEQ .ChgRep(𝑀,𝜎, `,mpk) : given 𝑀 ∈ (G∗
1
)ℓ , a valid signature 𝜎 ,
















AAEQ .Agg(mpk, {𝜎𝑖 }) : given mpk and set of valid signatures {𝜎𝑖 } of
size 𝑘 parse it as 𝜎𝑖 = (𝑍1,𝑖 , 𝑌1,𝑖 , 𝑌2,𝑖 ,𝑉2,𝑖 ) and return ⊥ if 𝑌1,𝑖 ≠
𝑌1, 𝑗 or 𝑌2,𝑖 ≠ 𝑌2, 𝑗 for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 , 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ [𝑘 ] and otherwise return
(∏𝑘𝑖=1 𝑍1,𝑖 , 𝑌1,1, 𝑌2,1,∏𝑘𝑖=1𝑉2,𝑖 ) .
AAEQ .Verify(mpk, {Attr}, 𝜎′, 𝑀) : parse mpk = (pkAttr1 , . . . , pkAttr𝑡 ) ,
{Attr} = ( (Attr𝑖 , 𝑣Attr𝑖 ))𝑖∈[𝑡 ] ∈ ( [𝑡 ] × {0, 1}∗)𝑘 , 𝜎′ = (𝑍1, 𝑌1, 𝑌2,𝑉2)
and𝑀 ∈ (G∗
1










𝐻Attr𝑗 (𝑣Attr𝑗 )) = 𝑒 (𝑔1,𝑉2)
Scheme 3: Our AAEQ Signature Scheme
Now, we prove the security of our AAEQ scheme in Scheme 3.
Theorem 3.11. The AAEQ scheme in Scheme 3 is EUF-CMA and
provides perfect adaption assuming that 𝐻 is a random oracle.
We again prove the above theorem using a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 3.12. TheAAEQ scheme in Scheme 3with bounded attribute-
space is EUF-CMA secure in the generic bilinear group model for
Type-3 bilinear groups.
The proof is given in Appendix B.4.
Lemma 3.13. The AAEQ in Scheme 3 is EUF-CMA secure for an
unbounded attribute-space when modeling 𝐻 as a random oracle.
Proof. Up to collisions in the random oracle, which happen
with negligible probability, the AAEQ in Scheme 3 and in particular
the analysis is identical to the proof of Lemma 3.12, but without
the restriction of the tag space being polynomial in size. □
Lemma 3.14. TheAAEQ scheme in Scheme 3 provides perfect adap-
tion if the TBEQd Scheme 2 provides perfect adaption.
Proof. This straightforwardly follows from the perfect adaption
notion of the underlying TBEQd scheme. □
4 CORE/HELPER CREDENTIALS
We recall that in ACs usually a personal computer or smartphone
is used to store and show the credential and it is assumed that
the user’s device is not limited in any way, i.e., computational or
communication-wise. A core/helper anonymous credential (CHAC)
system considers a different and more realistic scenario. We con-
sider two devices, a core device with limited capabilities (i.e., small
memory and computational power) and a helper device that is more
powerful and the only gateway of the core device to the outside
world, e.g., the Internet. The core device creates and stores the
secret key required to show credentials. However, since it is limited
it only creates so-called partial show tokens. The helper device
stores the credentials and finalizes the show token. The key idea
here is that the core device is responsible for protecting credentials
(i.e., the key to use them) and the helper device is responsible for
protecting the privacy of the showing procedure. In CHACs we
will only consider single round communications and therefore the
semantic will consist only of algorithms and not protocols as it is
the case in standard anonymous credentials.
4.1 Syntax and Security Model
Before defining the syntax of a CHAC system, we assume that
there exists a compressing and collision-resistant function AIDGen
(Attr, nonce) that on input a non-empty attribute set Attr and ran-
dom nonce ∈ {0, 1}_ , outputs an attribute identifier aid ∈ {0, 1}_ .
We will assume that the attribute set Attr contains pairs of a name
and value, e.g. a valid element is ('Age:', '18').
Definition 4.1 (CHAC). A core/helper anonymous credential
(CHAC) system consists of the following PPT algorithms:
SetupCHAC (1_): on input security parameter 1_ , this algorithm
outputs a common reference string 𝜌 , which is an implicit input
to the below algorithms. Some constructions might not require
such a string and work without a trusted setup.
IKGen(1_): on input security parameter 1_ , this algorithm outputs
the issuer’s key pair (isk, ipk).
CKGen(1_): on input security parameter 1_ , this algorithm outputs
the core device secret key ssk.
CObtain(aid, ipk, ssk): on input attribute identifier aid, issuer’s
public key ipk and secret key ssk, executed by the core device
outputs a partial credential request apreq.
HObtain(Attr, nonce, ipk, apreq): on input non-empty attribute set
Attr, a random nonce ∈ {0, 1}_ , issuer’s public key ipk and
partial credential request apreq, this algorithm executed by the
helper outputs a credential request areq.
Issue(Attr, nonce, areq, isk): on input non-empty attribute set Attr,
a random nonce ∈ {0, 1}_ , credential request areq and issuer’s
secret key isk, this algorithm outputs⊥ on failure and otherwise
a credential cred and a device identifier did.
CShow(aid, ipk, ssk): on input attribute identifier aid, issuer’s pub-
lic key ipk and secret key ssk, this algorithm executed by the
core device outputs a partial show token apsig.
HShow(Attr, nonce, cred, ipk, apsig): on input non-empty attribute
set Attr, a random nonce ∈ {0, 1}_ , credential cred, issuer’s
public key and partial show token apsig, this algorithm executed
by the helper outputs a full show token asig.
Verify(Attr, nonce, asig, ipk): on input non-empty attribute setAttr,
a nonce ∈ {0, 1}_ , full show token asig and issuer’s public key,
this algorithm outputs either accept(1) or reject(0).
We say that a core/helper anonymous credential system is secure
if it is correct, unforgeable, dependable, anonymous and compact.
Correctness. As one would expect, a showing of a credential with
respect to a non-empty set Attr𝐷 of attributes always verifies if the
credential was issued honestly for some attribute set Attr𝐴 with
Attr𝐷 ⊆ Attr𝐴 .
Unforgeability. Showing of attributes for which one does not pos-
sess credentials should not be possible. Even a malicious coalition
should be unable to combine their credentials and show a set of
attributes that no single member has.
Dependability. An adversary that takes control over the helper
device should be unable to show an honestly generated credential
in a given session without interaction with the core device, i.e. this
involves the case that credentials stored on the helper device leak.
Anonymity. A coalition of a malicious verifier and issuer should
not be able to identify the core/helper devices, except that they
possess a valid credential for the shown attributes. Furthermore,
different showings of the same credential should be unlinkable.
Compactness. The size of the full show token asig should not
depend on the number of attributes.
Formal definitions of those properties are given in Appendix A.6.
4.2 Generic Construction
We will now present our generic construction of a CHAC system
for up to 𝑡 attributes i.e., the upper bound on the number of different
attributes an issuer can issue. The two main building blocks are
a SFPK scheme with public key size ℓ and split signing, and an
AAEQ scheme with message size ℓ . We assume that the space of
SFPK public keys and AAEQ messages are compatible (the same).
We also assume that the SFPK key generation algorithm outputs
public keys in canonical form.
Our construction uses the idea of self-blindable certificates sim-
ilar to [63]. The core device generates a long-term SFPK key pair
that is used for all credentials. This key pair is used as a standard
signing key and the core device does not use the randomization
properties of the SFPK public key. However, this key is “certified”
by the issuer using the AAEQ scheme. Since it is attribute-based,
the issuer can easily create multiple signatures on the core device’s
public key depending on the possessed attributes. A credential is
then formed by appending all signatures, i.e., its size depends on
the number of attributes. To show an attribute the core device uses
the SFPK signing procedure to sign an attribute identifier aid send
by the helper device and which corresponds to the disclosed at-
tributes Attr and a nonce (from the verifier). Once the helper device
receives the SFPK signature from the core device it finalizes (we
use split signing here) and randomizes it. We will use 𝑛 to denote
the number of attributes that were issued to a user and by 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 the
number of attributes that are selectively disclosed within a show
token. Additionally, it aggregates all AAEQ signatures that corre-
spond to the shown attributes (i.e., the 𝑘 that should be selectively
disclosed) and uses the same random coins to randomize it. Note
that thanks to aggregation the show tokens size is independent
of the number of shown attributes. The final show token is a ran-
dom SFPK public key, the corresponding SFPK signature under
aid = AIDGen(Attr, nonce) and an aggregated AAEQ signature for
the public key. More details are given in Scheme 4.
We now show that Scheme 4 can be efficiently instantiated in
the random oracle model using an SFPK with split signing and an
AAEQ scheme (cf. Section 3).
Theorem 4.2 (Unforgeability). Scheme 4 is unforgeable assum-
ing the used SFPK with split signing is unforgeable, the used AAEQ
is unforgeable and AIDGen is collision-resistant.
Theorem 4.3 (Anonymity). Scheme 4 is anonymous if the used
AAEQ are adaptable and the SFPK signatures are class-hiding.
Theorem 4.4 (Dependability). Scheme 4 is dependable if SFPK
with split signing is unforgeable and AIDGen is collision-resistant.
For completeness the proofs for unforgeability, anonymity and
dependability are given respectively in Appendix C.1, C.2 and C.3.
Remark. For our concrete instantiation in the next section, we
require that for every user SFPK public key all requested attributes
are queried once and at the same time. While this is a proof artifact
to simplify the GGM proof, we 1) do not expect this to be a problem
formost use-cases and 2) conjecture that even if ignored this implies
no issues with the security of the CHAC construction.
5 CHAC EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate a concrete instantiation of our CHAC
system based on the building blocks from Section 3. Moreover,
discuss techniques used to optimize the smart card implementation
and helper device side of the CHAC system.
5.1 Setup
To evaluate our CHAC system we prepared a prototype implemen-
tation. We used a Multos smart card [60] as the core device and
implement the helper device on a smartphone with a Snapdragon
SetupCHAC (1_) : return 𝜌 ← SFPK.CRSGen(1_) .
IKGen(1_) : return (isk, ipk) ← AAEQ .Setup(1_, 𝑡, ℓ) .
CKGen(1_) : choose (skSFPK, pkSFPK) ← SFPK.KeyGen(1_) and com-
pute (stsecr, stpub) ← SFPK.Sign1 (1_) . Return ssk = (skSFPK, pkSFPK,
stsecr, stpub) .
CObtain(aid, ipk, ssk) : parse ssk = (skSFPK, pkSFPK, stsecr, stpub) , compute
pSigSFPK ← SFPK.Sign2 (skSFPK, aid, stsecr) and return apreq = (pkSFPK,
stpub, pSigSFPK) .
HObtain(Attr, nonce, ipk, apreq) : parse apreq = (pkSFPK, stpub, pSigSFPK) ,
compute SigSFPK ← SFPK.Sign3 (pSigSFPK, stpub) and return areq =
(pkSFPK, SigSFPK) .
Issue(Attr, nonce, areq, isk) : parse Attr = {(Attr1, 𝑣Attr1 ), . . . ,
(Attr𝑛, 𝑣Attr𝑛 ) }, areq = (pkSFPK, SigSFPK) and isk = msk.
• Compute identifier aid = AIDGen(Attr, nonce) and output ⊥ if
SFPK.Verify(pkSFPK, aid, SigSFPK) = 0 or canon(pkSFPK) ≠ 1.
• For all indices 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛} recompute the AAEQ keys
skAttr𝑖 ← AAEQ .AKGen(msk,Attr𝑖 ) and compute signatures
𝜎Attr𝑖 ← AAEQ .Sign(skAttr𝑖 , 𝑣Attr𝑖 , pkSFPK) .
• Output cred = (𝜎Attr1 , . . . , 𝜎Attr𝑛 ) and did = pkSFPK.
CShow(aid, ipk, ssk) : execute apsig← CObtain(aid, ipk, ssk) .
HShow(Attr, nonce, cred, ipk, apsig) : parse Attr = {(Attr1, 𝑣Attr1 ), . . . ,
(Attr𝑘 , 𝑣Attr𝑘 ) } apsig = (pkSFPK, pSigSFPK, stpub) .
• Compute identifier aid = AIDGen(Attr, nonce) and finalize signature
SigSFPK ← SFPK.Sign3 (pSigSFPK, stpub) .
• Set Attr𝜎 = {𝜎Attr1 , . . . , 𝜎Attr𝑘 } and aggregate the AAEQ signature
𝜎Attr ← AAEQ .Agg(ipk,Attr𝜎 ) .
• Compute (pk′SFPK, Sig
′
SFPK) ← SFPK.ReRand(pkSFPK, aid, SigSFPK, 𝑟 )
using blinding 𝑟 ←$ coinSFPK.
• Change the representation of the signature 𝜎′Attr ←
AAEQ .ChgRep(pkSFPK, 𝜎Attr, 𝑟 , ipk) .





Verify(Attr, nonce, asig, ipk) : Parse asig = (pk′SFPK, Sig
′
SFPK,
𝜎′Attr) and compute aid = AIDGen(Attr, nonce) . Return 0
if SFPK.Verify(pk′SFPK, aid, Sig
′
SFPK) = 0. Otherwise return
AAEQ .Verify(ipk, {(Attr𝑖 , 𝑣Attr𝑖 ) }, 𝜎′Attr, pk
′
SFPK) .
Scheme 4: Our Generic Construction of CHAC
710 processor and 6GB RAM running Android 10.0. To make the
evaluation more comprehensive, we executed the same helper de-
vice code on a laptop with Intel i7-7660U CPU @ 2.50 GHz with
16GB RAM running Windows 10.
We instantiate the bilinear groups using BN-256 curves [4] where
the group G1 is a standard curve defined over F𝑝 , G2 is a curve
defined over the extension field F𝑝2 and the target group is F𝑝12 .
5.2 Implementing SFPK on a Smart Card
On a high level, to implement the core device part of the con-
struction in Section 4.2 we have to implement the SFPK key gen-





). They involve the following elliptic curve operations:
SFPK.KeyGen: standard elliptic curve key generation,
SFPK.Sign
1
: point multiplication in G1 and G2,
SFPK.Sign
2
: point multiplication, addition, hashing in G1.
Below we describe three principles and explain in detail how we
implemented the above algorithms on-card. What is more impor-
tant, the described principles explain the design choices we made
in the construction of our CHAC system.
Standardized operations. Multi-app smart cards usually provide
a high-level programming API with standardized cryptographic
algorithms and some basic operations like memory copying. We
decided on Multos smart cards because they provide API access to
modular arithmetic, which is not the case for the popular Java Card
technology-based cards [64]. The main limitation of smart cards
is that algorithms implemented directly are strongly inefficient in
comparison to the ones provided by the API, e.g., Bichsel et. al. [10]
used API based exponentiation (via the RSA algorithm) and the
equation (𝑎 + 𝑏)2 = 𝑎2 + 2𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏2 to implement multiplication.
The Gemalto Multos card we used for our evaluation supports
elliptic curves, but it is limited to standard curves over F𝑝 . There
is also no support for low-level operations like point addition
and multiplication. Instead, the API provides access to an ellip-
tic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithm that outputs only the
x-coordinate of the resulting point. Implementing point addition





we do not need an
actual point multiplication algorithm because the scalar in both
cases is random and chosen by the core device. Therefore, we can
leverage the API provided elliptic curve key generation algorithm
that outputs the full representation of the public key. What is more,
the parameters of the curve can be easily changed and therefore
we can use an arbitrary group generator that allows us to compute,
e.g., H(𝑚)𝑟 by replacing the group generator by H(𝑚).
It remains to discuss how one can implement operations in G2,
since elliptic curves over an extension field F𝑝2 are not supported.
In this case there are no API level algorithms that could be used to
make a custom implementation faster. This is the main reason why
we divide the SFPK signing process and included a pre-computation
step SFPK.Sign
1
. Since the generation of the core’s device secret
key is a one-time operation and can take more time than the online
signing process. Thus, point multiplication for curves over F𝑝2 can
be implemented using the API provided modular arithmetic.
Reusable Code. Smart cards are not only constrained in terms
of computation power but also in terms of memory. Usually the
card provided around 100 KB for applications which consist of
compiled code and defined data structured (e.g., secret keys). We
took this into account while designing our construction by limiting
the operations of the core device. This is also the main reason why
CShow executes CObtain and on a high level, both algorithms are
just SFPK.Sign
2
. What is more, this is also the reason why the core
device performs operations that are independent, in some sense,
of the attributes shown/obtained which allowed us to store the
credentials on the helper device.
Helper device characteristics. In CHAC we consider the helper
device somewhat trusted, i.e., it should be unable to use credentials
without the core device but otherwise, it is considered trusted (i.e.,
w.r.t. privacy). We abuse this in our implementation. The first idea
we introduce is how to hash the aid value to a point in G1. Usually,
one would use techniques like Icart’s function [51] to do this, but
since we put some trust in the helper we can use a simpler algorithm.
The idea is to limit the aid space to only values for which computing
SHA-256 give a valid x-coordinate in G1. We also assume that the
helper provides a valid 𝑦-coordinate. This approach can be easily
shown to be secure.




· H(aid)𝑟 . We
can use the API provided EC key generation algorithm to generate
𝑟 as the secret key and H(aid)𝑟 as the public key. The benefit of
computing H(aid)𝑟 this way is that the algorithm checks if the
point H(aid) is actually on the curve and returns an error if it is
not. The only way the helper device can abuse this is by sending





·H(aid)−𝑟 . However, such a value can be easily obtained







gives no additional advantage.





on the card as an EC point). To do this we use our custom imple-
mentation of point addition. To make this operation more efficient
we only compute the x-coordinate of the result and let the helper
device recompute 𝑦 and −𝑦. This saves us some operation in F𝑝
on-card and the helper device can easily find the correct value using
the SFPK verification procedure.
5.3 Results
Various smart cards differ in computational power and available
algorithms, which influences the efficiency of custom cryptographic
algorithms. Thus, a comparison with results in related work would
not present meaningful data about the efficiency. However, an easy
way to assess the efficiency is to compare the algorithms execution
time to other well-known cryptographic algorithms. In Table 3
we compare our implementation of CObtain/CShow with elliptic
curve DSA, Diffie-Hellman, and key generation algorithms. All
algorithms are provided by the Multos API and work on the used
smart card. Additionally, we provide a prototype implementation
of the FIDO ECDAA algorithm [24, Chapter 3.5.2]. Note that the
efficiency of 𝑞-SDH based DAA schemes referenced in Table 1 are
close. This is due to the same number of point multiplications which
is the dominant computational factor. The execution time of our
ECDAA implementation can be used as a good estimator of the
execution time of the other algorithms in Table 1.
The numbers given in Table 3 correspond to an average of 100
executions. It is easy to see that our algorithms are roughly two
times slower than securely generating an elliptic curve key pair
on-card which is one of the basic operations used in practice. A
ECDAA implementation is two times slower than the smart card
part of our scheme. What is more, even a full showing of credentials
for CHAC is faster than just the smart card part of ECDAA.
To perform a comprehensive evaluation we created a simple
android application that naively implements the algorithms used
by the helper device and verifier. The core bilinear group opera-
tions were implemented using the Java based bnpairings library [5].
The only optimization used was the quaternary windowmethod for
pointmultiplicationwith pre-computation.We used pre-computation
for group generators 𝑔1, 𝑔2 and the core device’s SFPK public key


























cred with 100 Attributes cred with 1000 Attributes
Table 3: Average execution time in milliseconds for BN-256
curve (𝑁 = 100). Worst case scenario for all algorithms. Bi-
linear pairings implemented using bnpairings Java library
based on BigIntegers. In algorithm Verify∗ we assume that the
verifier uses pre-computed values 𝐻Attr (𝑣Attr) ∈ G2.
Data type Size: bits Size: group elements
areq - credential request 1536 4 · [G1]+[G2]
asig - show token 3072 6 · [G1]+3 · [G2]
cred - credential 𝐿 · 1536 2𝐿 · [G1]+2𝐿 · [G2]
apreq - partial request 1792 4 · [G1]+[G2] + [Z𝑝 ]
apsig - partial token 1792 4 · [G1]+[G2] + [Z𝑝 ]
Table 4: Size of data types for credential credwith 𝐿 attributes.
Bit size is presented for the BN-256 curve.
In our implementation, we used the standard Java based SHA-256
to implement the used pseudo-random function and for hashing to
both curves, where we assume that the system is setup in a way that
the hashed values always correspond to a x-coordinate on the curve.
This is similar to the hash to point function that we introduced
for the smart card implementation. We executed the same code
on a PC (laptop) with Intel i7-7660U CPU @ 2.50 GHz with 16GB
RAM. We also implemented the algorithm used by the issuer. For
showing a credential we consider the worst-case scenario which
for our construction is showing all attributes in a given credential.
The results are given in Table 3. It is easy to see that our construc-
tion is practical, since proving possession of even 1000 attributes
takes around 0.5s in case the helper device is a PC and 0.7s in case a
smartphone is used. Since we use a Java implementation for bilinear
pairing this is a pessimistic estimate and a native ARM library will
significantly increase efficiency on the smartphone. Show token ver-
ification is heavily influenced by our implementation of hashing to
G2. In case the values𝐻Attr (𝑣Attr) are pre-computed, verifying takes
almost the same amount of time for all sizes of credentials. This is
not an impractical assumption since the number of attributes and
values for an application must be limited. Otherwise, if values are
unique the credential becomes traceable. The most time-consuming
operation is the Issue algorithm. Fortunately, this workload can be
distributed since is consists of generating AAEQ signatures on the
same message but with different secret keys.
Finally, in Table 4 we present the size for credential requests,
show tokens and credentials stored by the helper device. We will
use [Z𝑝 ], [G1] and [G2] to respectively denote the element sizes
and 𝑠 is used to denote the number of attributes in a credential.
6 DISCUSSION AND FURTHER EXTENSIONS
In this section we discuss certain extensions and properties of our
construction.
Optional revocation. Contrary to some previous AC models and
constructions, in our CHAC model we do not consider revocation.
But we will show how to extend our generic construction from
Section 4 to allow blacklisting of core devices, i.e., revoke credentials
corresponding to a given device.
Recall that the core device uses the SFPK.KeyGen algorithm to
generate SFPK keys. For revocation we can replace it with the trap-
door generation SFPK.TKGen algorithm that outputs keys with the
same distribution and additionally a trapdoor 𝛿SFPK that can be used
in the SFPK.ChkRep algorithm. The core device can share this trap-
door with the helper device since this does not break unforgeability.
The helper device can encrypt it with respect to the authorities’ pub-
lic key and use standard zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs to prove that
the ciphertext contains𝛿SFPK forwhich SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿SFPK, pkSFPK
) = 1. Note that in our instantiation this corresponds to check-
ing pairing product equations for which we know efficient non-
interactive ZK proofs [47].
Finally, once a device is blacklisted the revocation authority
can decrypt and publish the trapdoor, which can be used by ver-
ifiers to check if the current session corresponds to revoked cre-
dentials. This approach obviously discloses all the show tokens
(past and future) created by the revoked device. A more general ap-
proach that prevents this is as follows. Instead of the trapdoor 𝛿SFPK,
we publish a randomized SFPK public key pk𝑅
𝑖
of the 𝑖-th black-
listed device. Now in addition to a show token asig = (pk′SFPK,
Sig′SFPK, 𝜎
′
Attr) the helper creates a ZK proof that there exists a
trapdoor 𝛿SFPK for which SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿SFPK, pk′SFPK) = 1 and




Pre-loading credentials. In our model, we assume that credentials
are used for systems where the helper device is also part of the
user’s platform. However, this is not the case for some applications
like for example e-tickets where the terminal that communicates
with the smart card (i.e., core device) is part of the service.
A solution for this setting is to pre-randomize the SFPK public
key and the AAEQ signatures by the helper device and store them
on the core device. To show such a credential, the core device can
simply sign the aid for the given session nonce and use the stored
values to create the full asig. Due to the memory constrains of the
core device, this however only works when the helper is frequently
available and the user can simply re-load “fresh” values.
Pre-randomized values can only be used by the core device be-
cause of the dependability property. Thus they can be stored in an
online database where each entry will be associated with a unique
identifier that is generated by the helper device. To allow the core
device to recompute those identifiers the helper device creates them
by hashing a secret key 𝑘pre together with a counter.
Distributed/Parallel issuing. An interesting property of our con-
struction is that the issuing algorithm can be easily distributed
between different servers (representing the issuing authority). Re-
call that for each attribute the respectiveAAEQ secret key skAttr𝑖 ←
AAEQ .AKGen(msk,Attr𝑖 ) is used to sign the SFPK public key that
is part of the credential request. The resulting credential is just a
tuple that contains all the AAEQ signatures on the SFPK public
key for each attribute. An easy way to distribute the workload is
as follows. Each server receives a dedicated set of attributes and
the corresponding AAEQ secret key. Once a request is received
and verified it is sent to the responsible servers which compute the
AAEQ signature and return them to a server combining the results.
(Un)Trusted setup. Our generic construction from Section 4.2
uses a trusted setup to generate a common reference string (CRS)
𝜌 . This is only required if the used SFPK scheme needs a CRS, as it
is the case for our instantiation. In particular, the CRS in Scheme 1
is composed of BG and two values 𝑌1 = 𝑔
𝑦
1




parameters can be easily computed using a deterministic procedure
and without secret coins, as it is the case for BN curves [4]. Unfortu-
nately, this is not the case for 𝑌1 and 𝑌2. It is required that the value
𝑦 is unknown, otherwise, the SFPK scheme is forgeable. On the
bright side, knowing 𝑦 does not help in breaking the class-hiding
property which is used to ensure the unlinkability of credentials.
A simple corollary from the above discussion is that in case the
system consists only of one issuer the CRS can be generated by that
entity. Unfortunately, it is not possible in case of multiple issuers as
the knowledge of𝑦 would allow using credentials of users issued by
different issuers. A workaround would be to generate an additive
share between all issuers. Instead of using values 𝑌1,𝑖 and 𝑌2,𝑖 gen-





𝑖=1 𝑌2,𝑖 where we use shares of each of the 𝑛 issuers. Note
that this is a well-known technique and involves additional step,
i.e., a proof of knowledge of the shared discrete logarithm.
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A OMITTED FORMAL DEFINITIONS
A.1 Preliminaries
We write Exp𝜙A,Ψ (1
_) ⇒ 1 for the event that the experiment Exp
returns 1, when instantiated with parameters 𝜙 , adversary A and
primitive Ψ, all of which possibly omitted. We define the adjusted





Pr[Exp𝜙A,Ψ (1_) ⇒ 1] − 𝑥 
If 𝑥 = 0, we write instead AdvExp
𝜙
A,Ψ (1
_) for its advantage.
A.2 Signatures with Flexible Public Key
Definition A.1 (Class-hiding with Key Corruption). For SFPKwith
relation R and adversary A we define the following experiment:
C-HRA,SFPK (_)
(sk𝑖 , pk𝑖 ) ←$ SFPK.KeyGen(1_) for 𝑖 ∈ {0, 1}
𝑏 ←$ {0, 1}; 𝑟 ←$ coin
(sk′, pk′) ← SFPK.ChgKeys(sk𝑏 , pk𝑏 , 𝑟 )









return 𝑏 = ˆ𝑏
A SFPK is class-hiding with key corruption if for all 𝑃𝑃𝑇 adver-







Definition A.2 (Existential Unforgeability under Flexible Public
Key). For scheme SFPKwith relation R and adversaryA we define
the following experiment:
EUF-CMARA,SFPK (_)
(sk, pk, 𝛿) ←$ SFPK.TKGen(1_) ;𝑄 := ∅
(pk′,𝑚∗, Sig∗) ←$ AO1 (sk,·),O2 (sk,·,·) (pk, 𝛿)
return𝑚∗ ∉ 𝑄 ∧
return SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿, pk′) = 1 ∧
SFPK.Verify(pk′,𝑚∗, Sig∗) = 1
O1 (sk,𝑚)
Sig←$ SFPK.Sign(sk,𝑚)
𝑄 := 𝑄 ∪ {𝑚}
return Sig
O2 (sk,𝑚, 𝑟 )
sk′ ←$ SFPK.ChgSK(sk, 𝑟 )
Sig←$ SFPK.Sign(sk′,𝑚)
𝑄 := 𝑄 ∪ {𝑚}
return Sig
A SFPK is existentially unforgeable with flexible public key under





A.3 Structure Preserving Signatures on
Equivalence Classes
EUF-CMA security is similar to that of conventional signatures, but
a forgery needs to be with respect to an unqueried class.
Definition A.3 (EUF-CMA). For scheme SPS-EQ and adversary
A we define the following experiment:
EUF-CMAA,SPS-EQ (_, ℓ)
BG←$ Setup(_) ;𝑄 := ∅
(sk, pk) ←$ KeyGen(BG, ℓ)
(𝑀∗, 𝜎∗) ← AO1 (sk,·) (pk)
return [𝑀∗ ] ≠ [𝑀 ] ∀𝑀 ∈ 𝑄 ∧
Verify(pk, 𝑀∗, 𝜎∗) = 1
O1 (sk, 𝑀)
𝜎 ←$ Sign(sk, 𝑀)
𝑄 := 𝑄 ∪ {𝑀 }
return 𝜎
An SPS-EQ over (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ is existentially unforgeable under adap-
tively chosen-message attacks, if for all PPT adversaries A, their
advantage AdvEUF-CMAA,SPS-EQ (1
_, ℓ) is negligible.
Definition A.4 (Perfect Adaption of Signatures under malicious
keys [44]). Let ℓ > 1. An SPS-EQ scheme SPS-EQ on (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ perfectly
adapts signatures under malicious keys if for all tuples (pk, 𝑀, 𝜎, `)
with 𝑀 ∈ (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ ∧ Verify(𝑀,𝜎, pk) = 1 ∧ ` ∈ Z∗𝑝 we have that
the output of ChgRep(𝑀,𝜎, `, pk) is a uniformly random element
in the space of signatures, conditioned on Verify(𝑀` , 𝜎 ′, pk) = 1.
A relaxation of this definition (perfect adaption) considers tu-
ples of the form (sk, pk, 𝑀, 𝜎, `) for which VKey(sk, pk) = 1 and
requires that the output of ChgRep(𝑀,𝜎, `, pk) and Sign(𝑀` , sk)
are identically distributed. We note that for our CHAC construction
we only need this relaxed definition.
A.4 Tag-Based Equivalence Class Signatures
Definition A.5 (EUF-CMA). For scheme TBEQ and adversary A
we define the following experiment:
EUF-CMAA,TBEQ (_, ℓ)
pars←$ Setup(_) ;𝑄 := ∅
(sk, pk) ←$ KeyGen(pars, ℓ)
(𝑀∗, 𝜎∗, 𝜏∗) ← AO1 (sk,·,·)CMA (pk)
return Verify(pk, 𝑀∗, 𝜏∗, 𝜎∗) = 1 ∧
( [𝑀∗ ], 𝜏∗) ≠ ( [𝑀 ], 𝜏) ∀(𝑀,𝜏) ∈ 𝑄
O1 (sk, 𝑀, 𝜏)
𝜎 ←$ Sign(sk, 𝑀, 𝜏)
𝑄 := 𝑄 ∪ {(𝑀,𝜏) }
return 𝜎
A TBEQ is EUF-CMA, secure if for all PPT adversaries A, their
advantage AdvEUFA,TBEQ (1
_, ℓ) is negligible.
A.5 Aggregatable Attribute-Based EQs
Definition A.6 (EUF-CMA). For scheme AAEQ and adversary A
we define the following experiment:
EUF-CMAA,AAEQ (_, 𝑡, ℓ)
(msk,mpk) ←$ Setup(1_, 𝑡, ℓ) ;𝑄,𝐴 := ∅




(Attr∗𝑖 , 𝑣∗Attr𝑖 , [𝑀
∗ ]) ∉ 𝑄 ∧
Verify(mpk, {Attr∗𝑖 }, 𝑀∗, 𝜎∗) = 1
O1 (msk,Attr, 𝑣Attr, 𝑀)
if (Attr, ·) ∉ 𝐴
skAttr ←$ AKGen(msk,Attr)
𝐴 := 𝐴 ∪ {(Attr, skAttr) }
𝜎 ←$ Sign(skAttr, 𝑣Attr, 𝑀)
𝑄 := 𝑄 ∪ {(Attr, 𝑣Attr, 𝑀) }
return {𝜎 }
An AAEQ is existentially unforgeable under chosen message at-
tacks if for all 𝑃𝑃𝑇 adversariesA, the advantageAdvEUF-CMAA,AAEQ (1
_, 𝑡, ℓ)
is negligible.
Definition A.7 (Perfect Adaption of Signatures). An AAEQ scheme
on (G∗
𝑖
)ℓ perfectly adapts signatures if for all tuples ({skAttr𝑖 },mpk,
𝑀, {Attr𝑖 }, 𝜎, `) where it holds that VKey({skAttr𝑖 },mpk) = 1,
Verify(mpk, {Attr𝑖 }, 𝜎, 𝑀) = 1,𝑀 ∈ (G∗𝑖 )
ℓ
, and ` ∈ Z∗𝑝 , the distribu-
tions (𝑀` ,Agg(mpk, {Sign(skAttr𝑖 , 𝑣Attr𝑖 , 𝑀
` , )}) andChgRep(𝑀,𝜎,
`,mpk) are identical.
A.6 CHAC: Formal Model
Let HD, CD, SN, MN be empty sets. We introduce lists DSK, CRED,
ATTR, D, AID, I2D to track honest device secret keys, credentials
issued to honest devices, the corresponding attributes, device iden-
tifiers, session identifiers for issuing/showing, a list used to identify
which credential corresponds to which honest device. Addition-
ally, we will use an array CATTR to store sets with attributes of
dishonest devices where we use the device identifiers as indexes
to the array. Finally, we introduce a counter 𝑐AID initialized to 0.
Moreover, let us define the following oracles.
OHD (𝑖) : takes as input an identifier 𝑖 and outputs ⊥ if 𝑖 ∈ HD∪CD.
Otherwise, it creates a honest core device by running DSK[𝑖] ←$
CKGen(1_), adding 𝑖 to HD and setting D[𝑖] = ⊥.
Ononce () : this allows the adversary to initiate an issuing/showing
session. The oracle chooses nonce←$ {0, 1}_ , increments counter
𝑐AID and sets AID[𝑐AID] = nonce. Finally, it returns (𝑐AID, nonce).
OObtIss (𝑖,Attr) : creates credentials for honest device 𝑖 , i.e. it out-
puts ⊥ if 𝑖 ∉ HD. Otherwise, it generates a nonce nonce←$ {0, 1}_ ,
generates aid←$ AIDGen(Attr, nonce) and issues a credential for 𝑖
by running apreq←$ CObtain(aid, ipk,DSK[𝑖]), areq←$ HObtain(
Attr, nonce, ipk, apreq), and (cred, did) ←$ Issue(Attr, nonce, areq,
isk). If cred = ⊥ it returns ⊥. Otherwise it adds (𝑖, cred,Attr) to
lists (I2D,CRED,ATTR) and sets D[𝑖] = did.
OCD (𝑖): takes as input an identifier 𝑖 . If 𝑖 ∉ HD it outputs ⊥. Other-
wise, it creates a corrupted core device by adding 𝑖 to CD and setting
HD = HD \ {𝑖}. If D[𝑖] ≠ ⊥ it computes the union CATTR[D[𝑖]]
of all sets ATTR[ 𝑗] for all 𝑗 where I2D[ 𝑗] = 𝑖 . Finally, it returns
DSK[𝑖].
OIssue (𝑠,Attr, areq): allows the adversary, who impersonates a ma-
licious device, to obtain credentials. It takes as input a session
index 𝑠 > 0 and returns ⊥ if AID[ 𝑗] = ⊥. The oracle generates
(cred, did) ←$ Issue(Attr,AID[ 𝑗], areq, isk) and aborts if cred = ⊥.
Otherwise, it computes the union CATTR[did] = CATTR[did] ∪
Attr. The oracle sets AID[ 𝑗] = ⊥ and returns cred.
OCShow (𝑖, aid): allows the adversary to obtain a partial show tokens
from an honest device and impersonate a malicious helper device.
It takes a input a device index 𝑖 and attribute identifier aid. If 𝑖 ∉ HD
then return⊥. Otherwise, compute apsig←$ CShow(aid, ipk,DSK[𝑖]),
adds (aid) to set SN and return apsig.
OHShow ( 𝑗, nonce,Attr): allows the adversary, who impersonates a
malicious verifier, to trigger showings with an honest device. It
takes as input an index of an issuance 𝑗 , nonce and a set of attributes
Attr. Let 𝑖 ← I2D[ 𝑗]. If 𝑖 ∉ HD or Attr ⊈ ATTR[ 𝑗] or CRED[ 𝑗] = ⊥
then return ⊥. Otherwise, compute aid ← AIDGen(Attr, nonce),
apsig←$ CShow(aid, ipk,DSK[𝑖]) and asig←$ HShow(Attr, nonce,
CRED[ 𝑗], ipk, apsig). Add (nonce) toMN and return asig.
OObtain1 (𝑖,Attr, nonce): allows the adversary, who impersonates a
malicious issuer, to issue credentials for a honest device. It takes
as input a device index 𝑖 and returns ⊥ if 𝑖 ∉ HD. Otherwise it
computes aid←$ AIDGen(Attr, nonce), apreq←$ CObtain(aid, ipk,
DSK[𝑖]), and areq ←$ HObtain(Attr, nonce, ipk, apreq). and adds
(𝑖, Y,Attr) to lists (I2D,CRED,ATTR).
OObtain2 ( 𝑗, cred): allows the adversary, who impersonates a ma-
licious issuer, to issue credentials for a honest device. It takes as
input a device index 𝑗 and returns ⊥ if cred = ⊥ or CRED[ 𝑗] ≠ Y.
Otherwise, it sets CRED[ 𝑗] = cred.
We define correctness, compactness, unforgeability, dependabil-
ity and anonymity as the following experiments. We assume that,
if required, the experiment honestly generates a reference string 𝜌
using Setup(1_) which is an implicit argument for the remaining
algorithms.
Definition A.8 (Correctness). A core/helper anonymous creden-
tials system is correct if for all _ ∈ N, all key pairs (isk, ipk) ←$
IKGen(1_), all secret key ssk ←$ CKGen(1_), all attribute sets
Attr𝑠 ⊆ Attr𝑜 and all nonces nonce𝑜 , nonce𝑠 ∈ {0, 1}_ , aid𝑜 ←$
AIDGen(Attr𝑜 , nonce𝑜 ), aid𝑠 ←$ AIDGen(Attr𝑠 , nonce𝑠 ), all cre-
dential requests areq←$ HObtain(Attr𝑜 , nonce𝑜 , ipk,CObtain(aid𝑜 ,
ipk, ssk)), all showings asig ←$ HShow(Attr𝑠 , nonce𝑠 , cred,
CShow(aid𝑠 , ssk)), we haveVerify(Attr, nonce, areq, ipk) = 1,where
(cred, did) ←$ Issue(Attr, nonce𝑜 , asig, isk) .
Definition A.9 (Compactness). A core/helper anonymous creden-
tials system is compact if for all _ ∈ N, all key pairs (isk, ipk) ←$
IKGen(1_), all secret key ssk ←$ CKGen(1_), all attribute sets
Attr𝑠 ⊆ Attr𝑜 and all nonces nonce𝑜 , nonce𝑠 ∈ {0, 1}_ , aid𝑜 ←$
AIDGen(Attr𝑜 , nonce𝑜 ), aid𝑠 ←$ AIDGen(Attr𝑠 , nonce𝑠 ), all cre-
dential requests areq←$ HObtain(Attr𝑜 , nonce𝑜 , ipk,CObtain(aid𝑜 ,
ipk, ssk)), all showings asig ←$ HShow(Attr𝑠 , nonce𝑠 , cred,
CShow(aid𝑠 , ssk)), we have |asig| ≤ 𝑂 (_), i.e., the size of the show-
ing token asig is independent of the attribute set |Attr𝑠 | and only
depends on _.
Definition A.10 (Unforgeability). For the core/helper anonymous
credential and adversary A we define the following experiment:
UNFACHAC (_)
(isk, ipk) ←$ IKGen(1_)
nonce←$ {0, 1}_
O := {OHD, OCD, Ononce, OObtIss, OIssue, OHShow }
(Attr∗, asig∗) ←$ AO (ipk, nonce)
if Verify(Attr∗, nonce, asig∗, ipk) = 1 and ∀𝑗 Attr∗ ⊈ CATTR[ 𝑗 ]
and (nonce) ∉ MN then return 1
else return 0
ACHAC is unforgeable if for all 𝑃𝑃𝑇 adversariesA, its advantage
in the above experiment is negligible:
AdvunfA,CHAC (_) = Pr
[
UNFACHAC (_) = 1
]
= negl(_) .
Definition A.11 (Dependability). For the core/helper anonymous
credential and adversary A we define the following experiment:
DEPACHAC (_)
(isk, ipk) ←$ IKGen(1_)
O := {O (1)HD , OObtIss, Ononce, OIssue, OCShow }
(Attr∗, nonce∗, asig∗) ←$ AO (ipk)
aid∗ ←$ AIDGen(Attr∗, nonce∗)
if (aid∗) ∈ SN then return 0
if Verify(Attr∗, nonce∗, asig∗, ipk) = 1 and
∀𝑗 Attr∗ ⊈ CATTR[ 𝑗 ] then
return 1
else return 0
ACHAC is dependable if for all 𝑃𝑃𝑇 adversariesA, its advantage
in the above experiment is negligible:
AdvdepA,CHAC (_) = Pr
[
DEPACHAC (_) = 1
]
= negl(_).
Definition A.12 (Anonymity). For the core/helper anonymous
credential and adversary A we define the following experiment:
ANONACHAC (_)
𝑏 ←$ {0, 1}
O := {OHD, OCD, OObtain1 , OObtain2 , OHShow }
( 𝑗0, 𝑗1,Attr∗, nonce∗, isk∗, ipk∗, st) ←$ AO (_)
𝑖0 ←$ I2D[ 𝑗0 ]; 𝑖1 ←$ I2D[ 𝑗1 ]
if 𝑖0, 𝑖1 ∉ HD or Attr∗ ⊈ ATTR[ 𝑗0 ] ∩ ATTR[ 𝑗1 ] then return 0
aid∗ ←$ AIDGen(Attr∗, nonce∗)
apsig←$ CShow(aid∗, ipk∗,DSK[𝑖𝑏 ])
asig←$ HShow(Attr∗, nonce∗,CRED[ 𝑗𝑏 ], ipk∗, apsig)
𝑏∗ ←$ AO (asig, st)
return 𝑏∗ = 𝑏
ACHAC is anonymous if for all 𝑃𝑃𝑇 adversariesA, its advantage
in the above experiment is negligible:
AdvanonA,CHAC (_) = Pr
[
ANONACHAC (_) = 1
]
= negl(_) .
Note that the adversary returns isk∗ which means that in our def-
inition we assume an honestly generated issuer’s key. This can
be ensured using standard proof techniques, i.e. the issuer proves
knowledge of the secret key. We define anonymity this way to
simplify our construction and proofs.
B PROOFS FOR SECTION 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
















) be an instance of the
BDDH problem. We will show that we can use any efficient adver-
saryA to solve the above problem instance. To do so, we will build
a reduction algorithm R that uses A in a black box manner.
Let𝑞ℎ themaximal number of random oracle queries made by the
adversary A and (Sig∗SFPK,𝑚
∗, pk∗SFPK) be the forgery returned by








choose a random index 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑞ℎ} and aborts the experiment in
case𝑚∗ is not the 𝑖-th query of A to the random oracle. Note that
this means that the probability thatR does not abort the experiment
at any point is 1/𝑞ℎ . What is more, for the 𝑖-th random oracle query
H(𝑚∗) the reduction answers with 𝑔ℎ𝑚∗
1
.
To simulate the unforgeabilty experiment, the reduction first
prepares the common reference string 𝜌 by setting 𝑌1 = 𝑔
𝑎
1




Next R prepares the public key pkSFPK and the trapdoor 𝜏SFPK.




from the problem instance. It
sets pkSFPK = (𝑔1, 𝑔𝑏1 ) and 𝜏SFPK = (𝑔
𝑏
2
). Moreover, the reduction







) and shares it
with A.
To answer A’s signing queries for message𝑚 and randomness
𝑡 (which is equal to 1 for oracle O1), the reduction R follows the
following steps:
(1) it first chooses𝑤𝑡 ←$ Z∗𝑝 ,






for some ℎ𝑚 ←$ Z∗𝑝 ,
(3) compute𝑤 = 𝑤𝑡 · 𝑡 ,
(4) it computes: Sig1SFPK = (𝑔
𝑏
1
)𝑡 ·𝑘𝑢 · (𝑈𝑤
1
)ℎ𝑚 ,
(5) set the pre-signature pSigSFPK := (Sig1SFPK,𝑤).
It is easy to see that this is a valid pre-signature. Note that a valid






)𝑟 ,𝑤). In this case, the
reduction has set 𝑟 = 𝑡 ·𝑤 · (𝑎 + 𝑘𝑢 ) and this means that the 𝑔𝑎 ·𝑏 ·𝑡
1
cancels out and the reduction does not need to compute 𝑔𝑎 ·𝑏
1
. Note
that this only works because the reduction is able to program the
random oracle and does not actually know the value 𝑟 . We also
assume that if A queries a message𝑚 prior to a query to signing






Finally, the adversary outputs the forgery (pk∗SFPK,𝑚
∗, Sig∗SFPK)
of A and the reduction proceeds as follows:











































(3) parse pk∗SFPK, and since for a valid forgery then pk
∗
SFPK ∈



















The probability that R successfully solves the bilinear decisional
Diffie-Hellman problem depends on the advantage of A and the
probability that R’s simulation succeeds.
□
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof. We exactly follow the proof of the underlying FHS15
SPS-EQ scheme in [45] and only highlight the differences. To ease
the readability we write elements inG2 with “hat”, e.g., as𝑉 instead
of𝑉2, and consequently the forgery is denoted as (𝑍,𝑌,𝑌,𝑉 ). Now,
if the take the discrete logarithms of all available group elements in
the forgery, we get an additional 𝑉 ∗ term (𝑣∗) and need to consider
the contributions of the ℎ elements (with coefficients \𝑖 ) and 𝑣 𝑗
elements (with coefficients a 𝑗 ) from the 𝑞 queries. So the changes

































From the forgery we know that we have∑︁
𝑖∈[ℓ ]
𝑚∗𝑖 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑧
∗𝑦∗ (2a)
𝑦∗ = 𝑦∗ (2b)
𝑣∗ = 𝑦∗ ˆℎ∗ (2c)
We can now follow the proof for FHS15 and in particular Claim 1
and Corollary 1 (which is exactly as in their proof), and by using
the same argumentation as in FHS15 for (2b), from









for (1a) we need to have 𝜋𝑦 = 𝜋?̂? and the non-zero coefficients are
𝜓𝑦,𝑗 and 𝜓?̂?, 𝑗 , where we have 𝜓𝑦,𝑗 = 𝜓?̂?, 𝑗 for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝑞]. Conse-
quently, the proof continues exactly as the FHS15 with the only
difference that we additionally need to investigate (2c). By leverag-
ing the simplification of Eq. (9) in [45], we know that there exists
one 𝑛 ∈ [𝑞] for which 𝑦∗ = 𝜓𝑦,𝑛 1𝑦𝑛 . By construction we have
ℎ∗ = ℎ𝑖 for a given 𝑖 ∈ [𝑘], i.e., the tag 𝜏𝑖 of the forgery. Now only








From FHS15 we know that 𝜌𝑧,𝑗𝜋𝑦𝑧𝑛 = 0 for all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑞]. But since 𝑧 𝑗
and 𝜌𝑧,𝑗 are non-zero for some 𝑗 , we have 𝜋𝑦 = 0 and thus \𝑣,𝑖 = 0












By leveraging the fact that all 𝑦𝑖 are distinct, we obtain that 𝑣
∗ =
a𝑣,𝑛 (ℎ𝑖 1𝑦𝑛 ) with a𝑣,𝑛 = 𝜓𝑦,𝑛 yielding that the 𝑣
∗
part is consistent
with the remainder representing a previous query with the exact
same tag and in particular the entire forgery is just a multiple of
previously queried message. Note that the simulation error is the
same as in the FHS15 proof.
□
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.8
Proof. For perfect adaption under malicious keys let𝑀 ∈ (G∗
1
)ℓ ,
𝜏 ∈ {0, 1}∗, 𝐻 : {0, 1}∗ → G2, pk ∈ (G∗
2
)ℓ and (𝑥𝑖 )𝑖∈[ℓ ] be such
that pk = (𝑔𝑥𝑖
2
)𝑖∈[ℓ ] . A signature (𝑍1, 𝑌1, 𝑌2,𝑉2) ∈ G1 × G∗1 ×
G∗
2













𝑦 ) for some𝑦 ∈ Z𝑝 .ChgRep(𝑀, (𝑍1, 𝑌1, 𝑌2,














which is a uniformly random element 𝜎 in the signature space
conditioned on Verify(𝑀` , 𝜎, pk) = 1.
TBEQ in Scheme 2 also satisfies the conventional perfect adap-
tion notion, since sk = (𝑥𝑖 )𝑖∈[ℓ ] is the only element satisfying
VKey(sk, pk) = 1 (which checks if pk = 𝑔sk
2
) and Sign(𝑀` , sk) (as
ChgRep) outputs a uniformly random element 𝜎 in the space of
signatures conditioned on Verify(𝑀` , 𝜎, pk) = 1.
□
B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.12
We use the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 3.6 and note that
we consider a bounded attribute-space represented by distinct and
random elements ℎ𝑖 ∈ G∗
2
, 𝑖 ∈ [𝑘], in the mpk (i.e., one for every
possible (Attr, 𝑣Attr) pair). Moreover, for the sake of readability we









)𝑖∈[ℓ ] respectively and it is straightforward to gener-
alize it to any 𝑛 > 2. Note that a query for the same representative
𝑀 to either of the keys results in using the same randomness 𝑦. We
require that for any message𝑀 to the Sign oracle of AAEQ , if the
adversary wants to obtain a signature for more than one attribute,
it will obtain signatures under both secret keys (attributes) using
the same randomness 𝑦 (which is sampled uniformly at random in
each query to Sign) and the queried attribute values 𝑣Attr and 𝑣Attr′
(which maps to two of the ℎ values). We will denote the correspond-
ing 𝑍1 elements of signatures under pk1 and pk2 using superscript
(1) and (2) respectively.
As in the proof of Lemma 3.6, we follow the the proof of the
underlying FHS15 SPS-EQ scheme in [45]. We start by taking the





































































































































And from the forgery we know that:∑︁
𝑖∈[ℓ ]
𝑚∗𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ) = 𝑧
∗𝑦∗ (3a)
𝑦∗ = 𝑦∗ (3b)





with the pair of (Attr, 𝑣Attr) values in the forgery w.l.o.g. correspond-
ing to ℎ1 and ℎ2 respectively. In the following we omit the analysis
of Equation (3c) as this follows from the exact same reasoning as in
the proof of Lemma 3.6. First, we observe that we can adopt Claim 1





𝑛 which in particular means that all 𝑦’s in such monomials
are different, one is 𝑦𝑛 and for every 𝑥 as well as 𝑢 there comes one
𝑦. Moreover, 𝑧
(1)
𝑛 contains one more 𝑥 than 𝑢’s and vice-versa for
𝑧
(2)
𝑛 . Now, we first look at Equation (3b) and comparing coefficients
immediately yields that 𝜋𝑦∗ = 𝜋?̂?∗ , that 𝜒?̂?,𝑖 = 𝜔?̂?,𝑖 = 0 for all
𝑖 ∈ [ℓ], \ ?̂?,𝑖 = a𝑣,𝑗 = 0 for all 𝑖 ∈ [𝑘] and𝜓𝑦,𝑗 = 𝜓?̂?, 𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑞].






= 0 for all
𝑗 ∈ [𝑞]. This simplifies Equation (3b) to































































Now, by expanding the RHS and comparing coefficients it follows
that 𝜋𝑧𝜋𝑦 = 0, 𝜋𝑧𝜓𝑦,𝑗 = 0, 𝜋𝑦𝜓𝑧,𝑗 = 0, 𝜋𝑦𝜌
(𝑏)
𝑧,𝑗
= 0 for all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑞],































, 𝑏 ∈ [2], has an equal number of 𝑦’s and 𝑥 ’s (respec-
tively 𝑢’s) in the numerator and consequently for all monomials
on the LHS there is one 𝑦 less than 𝑥 ’s (or 𝑢’s respectively). Con-




𝜓𝑦,𝑘 = 0 and 𝜌
(2)
𝑧,𝑗
𝜓𝑦,𝑘 = 0 for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘 (note that it may
be the case that either of 𝑧 (1) or 𝑧 (2) may not be present at all,
but one needs to be non-zero to represent a valid forgery. We will
consider the case where both are present subsequently, the other
cases are analogous). Furthermore, following the FHS15 argumen-
tation it follows that there is exactly one 𝑛 ∈ [𝑞] s.t. 𝜌 (𝑏)𝑧,𝑛𝜓𝑦,𝑛 ≠ 0.






























𝑚𝑛,𝑖 (𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 )
Now, plugging in𝑚𝑛,𝑖 and setting 𝛼 = 𝜓𝑦,𝑛 (𝜌 (1)𝑧,𝑛 + 𝜌
(2)




























(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 )
and by equating coefficients with the LHS of Equation (4) we obtain
that 𝜋𝑚∗,𝑖 = 𝛼𝜋𝑚,𝑛,𝑖 , 𝜌
(1)









𝜓𝑚∗,𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝛼𝜓𝑚,𝑛,𝑖,𝑘 , whereas the forgery just represents a previously
queried message. Finally, the simulation error of the generic group
is identical to FHS15.
C PROOFS FOR SECTION 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
We will prove this theorem using a series of hybrid arguments. Let






be the values returned
by the adversary and nonce∗ be the value given to the adversary.
Moreover, let 𝑞HD denote the maximum number of queries made to
the HD oracle by the adversary and aid∗ = AIDGen(Attr∗, nonce∗).
H0 : This is the anonymity experiment.
H1 : We change the way we generate the keys inside the OHD (𝑖)
oracle. Instead of SFPK.KeyGen we use trapdoor generation
SFPK.TKGen and retain the trapdoor 𝛿𝑖 .
H2 : We abort the experiment if there is a collision for aid∗, i.e. if
there was a query for a tuple (Attr, nonce) ≠ (Attr∗, nonce∗)
for which aid∗ = AIDGen(Attr, nonce).
H3 : We abort the experiment if SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿 𝑗 , pk∗SFPK) = 0 for
all 𝑗 ∈ [𝑞HD] and 𝑗 ∈ HD, i.e. we do not abort if the SFPK
public key is in a relation with an honest device public key.
H4 : We choose an index 𝑗 ∈ [𝑞HD] and we abort the experiment
if SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿 𝑗 , pk∗SFPK) = 0, i.e. we chose a specific
honest device.
Lemma C.1. HybridsH0 andH1 are indistinguishable.
Proof. For the SFPK scheme we have that SFPK.KeyGen and
SFPK.TKGen produce key pairs with identical distribution. □
LemmaC.2. The changes made in hybridH2 lowers the adversaries
advantage in the unforgeability experiment only by a negligible frac-
tion which is at most the advantage of breaking collision-resistance
of AIDGen.
Lemma C.3. The changes made in hybrid H3 lowers the adver-
saries advantage in the unforgeability experiment only by a negligible
fraction which is at most the advantage of an adversary breaking the
unforgeability of the AAEQ scheme.
Proof. We will show this proof via a simple reduction. The
idea for the reduction is to instead of using the AKGen and Sign
algorithm inside Issue to generate credentials cred for devices the
reduction will use its AAEQ signing query. In the end, the adversary




Attr)) which contains a
AAEQ forgery for message (pk∗SFPK,Attr
∗).
Note that because we only abort if the SFPK public key pkSFPK
is not in a relation with any of the honest device and by definition
this excludes the usage of all corrupted attribute. Thus, we know
that Attr∗ was never queried together with an element from the
class [pk∗SFPK]R to the AAEQ signing oracle. □
Lemma C.4. HybridH4 does not abort with prob. 1/𝑞HD.
LemmaC.5. An adversary that has non-negligible advantage against
the unforgeability experiment inH4 can be used to break the unforge-
ability of the SFPK scheme.
Proof. We will show this proof via a simple reduction. The
idea is for the reduction to simulate the 𝑗-the device using the
SFPK signing oracle. In other words, instead of running algorithm
CObtain, CShow for the secret device key DSK[ 𝑗], the reduction
asks the oracle for the corresponding signature.
Finally the adversary output asig∗ for which we know that
SFPK.ChkRep(𝛿 𝑗 , pk∗SFPK) = 1, i.e. that the signature Sig
∗
SFPK cor-
responds to the device that the reduction simulated using the SFPK
challenges. Thus by returning (pk∗SFPK, aid
∗, Sig∗SFPK) the reduction
outputs a valid forgery against the SFPK unforgeability experi-
ment. □
C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
We will prove this theorem using a series of hybrid arguments.
Let 𝑞HD denote the maximum number of queries made to the HD





challenge signature given to the adversary.
H0 : This is the anonymity experiment.
H1 : We change the way the value 𝜎 ′Attr is computed inside oracle
OHShow, i.e. instead of randomizing the AAEQ signature
using ChgRep, we use the secret key isk∗ to generate a fresh
signature on pk′SFPK.
H2 : We choose two distinct indexes 𝑘0, 𝑘1 ∈ [𝑞HD] and abort
the experiment if 𝑖0 ≠ 𝑘0 and 𝑖1 ≠ 𝑘1 where 𝑖0 ←$ I2D[ 𝑗0],
𝑖1 ←$ I2D[ 𝑗1] and 𝑗0, 𝑗1 were returned by the adversary.
Lemma C.6. HybridsH0 andH1 are indistinguishable assuming
the AAEQ scheme perfectly adapts signatures.
Lemma C.7. The experiment is not aborted inH2 with probability
(1/𝑞HD)2.
LemmaC.8. An adversary that has non-negligible advantage against
the anonymity experiment inH2 can be used to break the class-hiding
property of SFPK signatures.









), pk′) by the challenger and access to









) to respectively simulate
the devices 𝑘0 and 𝑘1.
Finally, it receives ( 𝑗0, 𝑗1,Attr∗, nonce∗, isk∗, ipk∗, st) from the
adversary. Because we are inH2 we know that 𝑗0, 𝑗1 correspond
to devices 𝑘0, 𝑘1. The reduction now sets pk′SFPK = pk
′
, uses
it’s oracle to generate the signature Sig′SFPK on message aid
∗ =
AIDGen(Attr∗, nonce∗) and creates 𝜎 ′Attr as perH2. The adversary
ends the experiment by outputting 𝑏∗ which is also returned by
reduction. It is easy to see that in this case pk′ = pk𝑏 and the adver-
sary can be used this way to break the class-hiding property. □
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4.4
The proof follows using a simple reduction. The key point to no-
tice is that there is only one honest device created in this ex-
periment and the reduction can use it’s own signing oracle to
get a SFPK signature and answer queries to the OCShow oracle.
What is more, since we require that aid∗ ∉ SN it follows that








can be used by the reduction as a valid forgery. Note that in case
there exists a tuple (Attr, nonce) ≠ (Attr∗, nonce∗) for which aid∗ =
AIDGen(Attr, nonce) the reduction can return both pairs as a colli-
sion for AIDGen.
